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BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: THE PERILS
OF REPORTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Anne Lawton*
"Now wailing in fear, we rowed on up those straits,
Scylla to starboard, dreaded Charybdis off to port,
her horrible whirlpool gulping the sea-surge down, down...
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost ten years since I reported my colleague Alan White,
a tenured professor in the finance department at Miami University's School
of Business, for sexual harassment.2 In retrospect, I realize that reporting
the harassment to my employer was not the wisest course of action. I
"won" my case, but in the long run, it was I who was the loser. The time,
energy, and money that I spent in negotiating the pathways of the
*Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. A.B., M.B.A., J.D.,
University of Michigan. I dedicate this article to Dan Herron, Joshua Schwarz, and Rebecca
Luzadis-good friends, as well as academic colleagues and citizens. The article benefited
from the helpful comments and advice of Kim Baker, Carl Bogus, Nancy Cook, Peter
Margulies, Jane Rindsberg, and Elaine Yakura. Once again, I must thank Emilie Benoit for
digging deep to find the impossible.
1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 12: 253-55 (Robert Fagles trans.,Viking 1996). According to
Greek mythology, Scylla, a twelve-legged, six-headed monster, lived in a "fog-bound
cavern" in an enormous rock along the coast of Italy. See id. at 12: 81-111. The "awesome
Charybdis" took the shape of a whirlpool lying beneath another large rock "an arrow-shot
apart" from the crag from which Scylla terrorized sailing vessels. See id. at 12:112-19; see
also Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Charybdis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charybdis
(last visited Mar. 20, 2007). In the Odyssey, Odysseus had to steer a perilous course
between the monstrous Scylla and the terrifying Charybdis, both of which threatened to
destroy his ship and his crew. Thus, the expression "between Scylla and Charybdis" means
"between two perils or evils, neither of which can be evaded without risking the other."
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1633 (2d ed. 1983).
2. With a few exceptions (my and my attorney's name), I use pseudonyms for the
faculty members and administrators mentioned in this Article; I did not change names in
case citations. My harasser has passed away, and, with one exception, all of the university
officials mentioned in this Article - the various chairmen, deans, and university
administrators - either have retired or no longer occupy the positions they held while I was
at Miami.
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university's labyrinthine procedure, as well as the retaliation that ultimately
drove me to leave my job, made my victory a hollow one, indeed.
Judicial opinions on sexual harassment portray reporting as the only
reasonable course of action for the womanwho finds herself the target of
sexual harassment in the workplace.3 The hazards of reporting rarely are
discussed, because the law assumes that employers are objective, non-
discriminating entities that do not tolerate harassment in the workplace and
that employers' and victims' interests coincide. Nothing is further from the
truth.
Reporting does not solve the harassment problem within an
organization, because reporting is a solution to an individual problem.
Harassment is not an individual problem; it is an organizational problem.
4
While harassment may occur in any workplace, its occurrence is not, as the
courts assume, a merely random, unpredictable event. Harassment is far
more likely to occur in male-dominated workplaces in which women are
perceived as interlopers onto male work turf and in workplaces in which
harassing workplace conduct is tolerated or condoned.5 It is in precisely
these workplaces where reporting harassment is the riskiest for the woman
involved.
Thus, the law creates a double bind for the victim of harassment,
placing her between Scylla and Charybdis.6 If she reports the harassment,
she is likely to experience retaliation.7 If the employer's intervention stops
3. On the law's requirement that victims of harassment report harassment or risk
losing the right to pursue a claim of sexual harassment in federal court, see Anne Lawton,
The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 817, 849 (2005)
(discussing problems with Eleventh Circuit analysis of sexual harassment claims)
(discussing how time delays add to the risk of a victim losing their case or even
discouraging them from filing a complaint) [hereinafter Lawton, Bad Apple]; Anne Lawton,
Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 253-55 (2004) [hereinafter Lawton, Empirical Vacuum]. Most
victims of harassment are women and the vast majority of harassers are men. See DEBORAH
L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 97 (1997); Anne Lawton,
The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harassment, 11 YALE J.
L. & FEMINIsM 75, 81, 83 (1999) [hereinafter Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes]. Therefore,
throughout this Essay, I use "woman", "women", and female pronouns to refer to the
victims of harassment, and "men", "man", and male pronouns when referring to harassers.
4. See generally Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3 (explaining how the current legal
framework incorrectly identifies the source of harassment as the individual harasser, rather
than recognizing that harassment occurs because particular organizations tolerate or
condone its occurrence).
5. Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3, at 840-41.
6. See supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006)
(describing retaliation that followed complaint of sexual harassment); see also Joanna
Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L.
REv. 671, 725 (2000) ("For women in professional careers, such as law, medicine, or
academics, silence in the face of harassment may be a calculated measure to avoid losing the
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the harassment, all she has accomplished is replacing one problem-
harassment-for another-retaliation. But, if a woman does not report the
harassment to her employer, for example because she fears retaliation, then
she has to figure out some way to deal with the harasser on her own, or find
another job. If she finds another job and leaves her current position
without reporting, she likely will lose any subsequent lawsuit that she files
against her employer for sexual harassment because she did not first notify
her employer of the harassing workplace conduct.8 In other words, once
harassment occurs, the choices that women face are all bad.
For those few women who have the ability to easily move from job to
job without sacrificing salary or prospects, finding other employment may
be the best solution. But, for the vast majority of women for whom exit is
not a viable strategy, the law boxes them in: there simply is no good way to
proceed under the current legal framework.
That was my experience. I naively placed my faith in university
officials and university procedures. Reporting Professor White stopped the
harassment, but also generated a pattern of conduct, some of which was
clearly retaliatory in nature, which made my life as a tenure-track faculty
member substantially more difficult than it had been prior to reporting.
Thus, I offer up this story of harassment within the academy as a
cautionary tale about the perils of reporting.9  The story reads
sponsorship or mentiorship of an older, more established male partner, doctor or tenured
professor."); Brian Klaas & Angelo DeNisi, Managerial Reactions to Employee Dissent:
The Impact of Grievance Activity on Performance Ratings, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 705, 711 &
Tbl. 1 (1989) (finding, in study of unionized employees at a public sector firm, that
supervisors, by deflating performance evaluations, punish employees who file and win
grievances against the supervisor); Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 257-60
(describing various ways in which employers retaliate against those who report sexual
harassment).
8. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 700 (stating that "[r]arely, if ever, will courts
excuse a plaintiff from filing an internal complaint due to fear of retaliation or the
perception that such complaints are futile"); Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at
220 n. 103, 242, 262 n. 288 (citing cases).
9. I am indebted to those who came before, using stories to enrich the body of legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Nancy Cook, In Celia's Defense: Transforming the Story of Property
Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Cases into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 197 (1999) (detailing the story of a slave, celia, who murdered her master out
of fear of his unsolicited sexual advances and threats); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1988) (discussing
the trend of narrative and legal storytelling as a tool for marginalized groups); Peter
Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic
Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (1994)
(calling for the increased use of narrative to establish a civic republican model of clinical
legal education). This Article differs from some of this earlier narrative work in that it
involves my own, rather than another's, story of sexual harassment. In that sense, it fits
more within the body of first-person narrative legal scholarship. See, e.g., Paulette M.
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.
2007]
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chronologically. In Part II, I describe the harassment, as well as my initial
decision to use the. university's informal resolution process. In Part III, I
explain how the informal process failed, thereby requiring me to invoke the
university's formal procedures. Part IV discusses the myths of female
hypersensitivity and male vulnerability to opportunistic female colleagues
that commonly are invoked in sexual harassment cases and that Professor
White relied upon to damage my credibility. In Part V, I pick up on a
theme begun in Part IV.C of this article-how the university's procedures,
though seemingly neutral, worked to Professor White's advantage and my
disadvantage. Part VI describes the aftermath of reporting and how the
repeated struggles I faced after reporting eventually led to my resignation
from the university in the spring of 2000.
I realize that many law review articles, while critical of legal rules or
judicial opinions, often end on an optimistic note about the possibility for
legal change. I am less sanguine about the prospects for change in sexual
harassment law. Meaningful change requires federal judges to look behind
employers' paper policies and procedures to determine how harassment
policies work in practice.' 0 That is unlikely to occur." Therefore, I caution
women who fall victim to harassment about the wisdom of relying on their
employers to obtain some measure of justice for the harms visited upon
them by sexual harassment.
II. "A KISS IS NOT JUST A KISS"' 2
It was Sunday, December 22, 1996, three days before Christmas, and I
was in my office finishing several letters of recommendation for students
who were applying to law school. The building was quiet and it appeared
that no one, besides me, was around. To my surprise, two other finance
J. 365 (1991).
10. Cf e.g., Richard B. Peterson & David Lewin, Research on Unionized Grievance
Procedures: Management Issues and Recommendations, 39 HUMAN REs. MGMT. 395, 403
(2000) (recommending periodic employee surveys of the "perceived fairness of grievance
handling processes and grievance decision outcomes" because "perceived fairness of
grievance handling . . .shapes [employees'] assessment of the overall effectiveness of
grievance procedures"); see also Lynn Perry Wooten and Erika Hayes James, When Firms
Fail to Learn: The Perpetuation of Discrimination in the Workplace, 13 J. MGMT. INQUIRY
23, 27 (2004) (noting that "the existence of antidiscrimination policies (e.g., EEO
statements) often allows organizations to view discrimination incidents as anomalies...
[and] create[s] the appearance that discrimination cannot exist in the organization").
11. See generally Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3 (noting the tendency of
employers to engage in "file cabinet" compliance and the failure of federal judges to look
beyond paper policies and procedures when evaluating employers' anti-harassment efforts).
12. Response to Letter of Findings Regarding Anne M. Lawton's Complaint Against
Alan White, filed May 9, 1997, with Dep't. of Affirmative Action, Miami Univ., 2 at 2
[hereinafter Response to DAA Findings] (on file with author).
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department faculty members were in the coffee lounge when I went for
coffee before settling down to work. I greeted them both, but left quickly
because I wanted to avoid one of them, Alan White, whose conduct during
the past two months had made me increasingly uncomfortable.
I was working at my computer when, shortly thereafter, Professor
White entered my office. I had closed the door, but apparently it had not
caught so the door did not lock. Professor White came up behind me at the
computer and began massaging my shoulders. I stood up to get him to stop
touching me and tried to distract him by showing him materials from an
international bioethics conference I had just attended in Strasbourg, France.
That strategy failed. He patted my rear end, at which point, I realized that I
had to get him out of my office. I was uncertain whether the other finance
department faculty member was around and I had seen no one else in the
building. I did not want to be trapped inside the confines of my small
office with a man who was touching and groping me. I picked up my
coffee cup, left the office, and started walking toward the coffee lounge.
Unfortunately, Professor White decided to accompany me. He put his arm
around my waist, pulled me toward him, and kissed me on the neck. I
realized that the situation was getting out of control, but I did not want to
anger him. As the most recently tenured member of the finance
department, he voted on both my promotion and tenure. I also had injured
my ankle the evening before and wasn't sure that I could sprint down the
hall away from him. But, what was perhaps most distressing, was the fact
that until recently, I had considered him a friend and colleague. So, instead
of confronting him, I pulled away and asked him why he was being so
"affectionate." It was a bad choice of words, given what was happening,
but I was thinking only of finding a safe place and avoiding any
confrontation with Professor White in what appeared to be a deserted
building.
I got my coffee and started back toward my office, hoping that
Professor White had stayed behind in the coffee lounge. To my chagrin, he
followed me back to my office. He noticed that I was limping, and offered
to massage my ankle, which I refused. By that point, I had reached my
office door. I stood at the door waiting for him to pass by, so that I would
not be in the position once again of being trapped inside my office with
him. As he passed me by, he fired off one last suggestive salvo, informing
me that I knew where I could go for some "affection." I immediately went
into my office, made certain that the door was locked, and called my friend
and colleague Ella Street, who was a visiting law professor in the finance
department, to ask for her advice. We talked for awhile, but I remained
undecided on how to proceed when I hung up the phone. Fortunately,
20071
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Professor White was not around when I left the office for home.
3
I spent the holidays talking with family and friends about what I
should do. December 22 was not the first time that Professor White had
touched me in intimate and sexually inappropriate ways at work.14 While
sitting next to me at a school-wide faculty meeting, he had patted my
stockinged leg; he had taken me by the hand on one occasion when I had
tried to leave my office because he was making me feel uncomfortable; and
he had touched me on the rear end when I passed by him in the main
faculty office.15 Most of these events took place in December of 1996, but
the faculty meeting had occurred earlier in the fall term. Apart from
Professor Street, however, I had not spoken about or reported these
incidents, because I hoped that they were aberrations and that avoiding
Professor White would stop the harassment. 16
My reluctance to report Professor White stemmed, at least in part,
from my fear that he would hold my reporting him for sexual harassment
against me during tenure and promotion deliberations. I was an untenured
faculty member, just beginning the second year of a six-year tenure track.
Professor White, who had obtained tenure only the year before, voted on
my tenure and promotion case. He was, in effect, one of my supervisors,
and I did not wish to alienate or, worse, antagonize him.
But, I also worried how the other members of the department would
view my report of sexual harassment. I was an "outsider" in the finance
department: I was both a woman and a lawyer. Of fifteen tenured or
tenure-track faculty members in the department, only two were women,
comprising a mere 13% of the finance department faculty, and only three,
including myself, were lawyers. Some members of the finance department
and of the business school faculty simply did not know how to interact with
women as professional colleagues, because there were so few women
working as tenured or tenure-track faculty at the business school. " There
13. The preceding description is taken from the formal complaint of sexual harassment
that I filed with the Department of Affirmative Action at Miami University. See Formal
Complaint of Sexual Harassment, filed April 11, 1997, with Dep't. of Affirmative Action,
Miami Univ., at 5-6 [hereinafter Formal Complaint] (on file with author).
14. Nor was it the only improper or sexist conduct to which I had been exposed during
my short tenure at the business school. See infra note 131-33 and accompanying text.
15. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 4-5.
16. While I did not realize it at the time, my response to Professor White's harassment
was neither unique nor unusual. As the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") found in
its three large-scale studies of sexual harassment in the federal workplace, "[tlhe single most
common response of employees who are targets of sexually harassing behaviors .. .has
been, and continues to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing." MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS,
PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 29 (1995). For a discussion of the MSPB studies and
their findings, see Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 79-81, 86-7.
17. See infra Part VI.B.1.
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was only one tenured woman in the finance department out of a tenured
faculty of fourteen (7%), and women comprised approximately 15% of the
tenured or tenure-track faculty within the school of business.
Moreover, no necessary connection existed between the disciplines of
law and finance. The type of legal scholarship in which Martin Brown, my
mentor and another lawyer in the department, and I were engaged did not
fit within the dominant quantitative model for research that prevailed in the
department. In addition, just before I was hired, another law professor in
the department had been denied tenure and had sued the university."8
Although I had worked in the department for only a year and a half, I
realized that some of my colleagues would necessarily view with
skepticism any allegation of sexual harassment against "one of their own."
The problem was that I simply did not fit in: I was neither male nor a
finance professor. Unlike Professor White, I was the "new kid on the
block," having been at the business school for a mere year and a half at the
time-a woman intruding into a largely male enclave.19
But, I realized that I needed to report the harassment, because
avoiding Professor White was not working. On January 7, 1997, I spoke
with Bruce Evans, the Director of the Department of Affirmative Action
("DAA"), about my experiences with Professor White. Mr. Evans
provided me with copies of the university's informal and formal resolution
procedures and recommended that I not speak with Professor White
alone.20 I did not decide until the next day to opt for the university's
informal process; I did so as a compromise between my need to report and
my desire to minimize the impact of reporting on my reputation within the
department.2' On January 8, I contacted Mr. Evans and told him I wanted
to use the informal resolution process; he scheduled the meeting for Friday,
January 10, 1997.
On the morning of January 10, I met with Mr. Evans and Professor
White.22 Professor White tried to minimize my complaints, by stating that
he was a friendly person and patted his colleagues, both male and female,
on the back. I explained to Professor White the nature of my complaints
18. See infra note 63.
19. See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 648
(2003) (stating that "[r]esearch indicates not only that work cultures in workplaces
dominated by white males are likely to develop around a white, male norm, but also that
outsiders, whether identified by race, sex, or both, must overcome a presumption against
fit") (footnote omitted).
20. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 6-7.
21. The university also "encourage[d] informal means of mediation and resolution
where practical and appropriate." MIAMI UNIVERSITY POLICY AND INFORMATION MANUAL
§3.2122A [hereinafter MUPIM] (on file with author).
22. The following synopsis about the informal resolution procedure is taken from my
formal sexual harassment complaint. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 6-9.
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and noted that it was not back-patting that was the issue. I recounted to
him the behaviors that I found offensive, in particular, the events of
December 22. Professor White responded by asking me whether he had
been drinking. I was taken aback. He was suggesting, in front of a
university official, that he was so drunk that he had blacked out and could
not remember what had transpired on December 22. To my surprise, Mr.
Evans did not pursue the matter.
Professor White also raised a concern about his participation in any
decisions about my promotion and tenure. He indicated that whether he
voted for or against tenure, his decision would appear suspect based on my
allegation of sexual harassment. But, because the informal process at
Miami involved no fact finding, Mr. Evans could make no formal ruling on
the need for Professor White to recuse himself from deliberations on my
promotion and tenure decision.
Professor White never admitted any wrongdoing during the informal
resolution process. While he apologized to me, he did so after the meeting
outside the earshot of the Director of the DAA.23 Moreover, while he
raised concerns about the confidentiality of the informal resolution process,
Professor White simultaneously misrepresented to at least one faculty
member in the department what had occurred during the informal process.
24
Prior to the January 10 meeting, Professor White spoke with Charles Lang,
the chairman of the finance department's promotion and tenure committee
("P&T Committee"). Professor White told Professor Lang that he had been
summoned to the DAA, based on a complaint that I had made. But,
Professor White told Professor Lang that because he had been drinking on
December 22, he did not recall what had occurred. Nonetheless, he told
Professor Lang that he believed the visit to the DAA had to do with a
"tasteless joke" and advised Professor Lang to "leave your humor at
home. 25
After the informal resolution process, Professor White spoke once
again with Professor Lang, explaining that he "had learned his lesson" and
23. See My personal reply to Ms. Anne Lawton's formal complaint of sexual
harassment, filed April 21, 1997, with Dep't. of Affirmative Action, Miami Univ., at 1
[hereinafter Personal Reply] (on file with author].
24. The ensuing discussion about the conversation between Professors Lang and White
is taken from both my formal complaint and a contemporaneous journal of events that I
maintained. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 9; Facsimile from author to Sarah
Poston, legal counsel for author, at 8 (March 17, 1997, 16:30 EST) [hereinafter Journal of
Events] (on file with author).
25. Memorandum re: Conversation with Alan White, from Ellen Hope, Assoc. Prof.,
Econ. Dep't., Miami Univ., to Bruce Evans, Dir., Dep't. of Affirmative Action, Miami
Univ., April 29, 1997, at 4 (on file with author); see also Statement of Jane Cassidy, May
14, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Cassidy Statement] (on file with author); see Journal of Events,
supra note 24, at 10.
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that the problem had been worked out. Professor White did not provide
Professor Lang with details of the January 10 meeting or correct the
misimpression that my complaint had to do with a "tasteless joke."
III. GOING FORMAL
My informal complaint worked in one respect: it stopped the
harassment. In other significant respects, the process was a failure. The
absence of formal fact finding meant that, according to the university,
Professor White had not engaged in sexual harassment. Thus, the
presumption was that Professor White could impartially judge my
application for promotion and tenure, and participate in my annual reviews.
While Professor White had not objected to recusing himself from the
department's P&T Committee, because he was doing so on a permanent
basis, he and I had to negotiate the terms of that recusal. John Green, the
chairman of the finance department, also participated in the negotiations. It
was during this time period that I realized I needed legal representation.26
Two problems arose during negotiation of the recusal agreement.
First, I wanted an explanation in the agreement as to why I sought
Professor White's recusal from the committee performing my annual
reviews and deciding on my promotion and tenure. When I first raised the
prospect of asking for Professor White's recusal from the P&T Committee,
Professor Green cautioned me against doing so.2 7 He felt that such a
28request might reflect poorly on me with some members of the department.
Thus, I was concerned that absent such a clear statement in the recusal
agreement, speculation about my reasons would abound and that much of
that speculation would redound to my detriment.
Second, I wanted members of the department to know the facts. I
knew that Professor White already had misrepresented to Professor Lang
the reasons for my complaint to the DAA. I suspected that he was lying to
other members of the department, as well, and I thought that a formal
statement included as part of the recusal agreement might lay to rest some
of the rumors and lies. The members of the department then could
evaluate, against the known facts, any derogatory statements that Professor
White made about me or my work.
Moreover, a discussion at a spring 1997 faculty meeting about outside
letters of review drove home the importance to me of setting the record
26. I hired the firm of Laufman, Rauh & Gerhardstein, in Cincinnati, Ohio. See
Representation Agreement, March 19, 1997. I was friends with Sarah Poston, one of the
firm's attorneys. Ms. Poston agreed to represent me at half the firm's hourly fee as a
professional courtesy. See id.
27. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 1.
28. Id.
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straight. During this faculty meeting, members of the department were
discussing a requirement that faculty members in their tenure year obtain
outside letters reviewing their scholarship.29  During the discussion,
Professor White suggested requiring outside letters for the untenured
faculty member's third-year review. a  At that time, I was the only
untenured faculty member in the department. It appeared that Professor
White, under the guise of implementing some objective procedure, was
trying to make the tenure process more arduous for me, by requiring
outside letters of review, potentially not only in my tenure year but also
three years earlier, for my third-year review. No other member of the
department had been required to submit outside letters of review for their
third-year review. Without knowing the facts of my complaint, other
members of the department would not necessarily question Professor
White's motivation in creating another barrier to tenure that no other
member of the department had had to overcome.
Accordingly, I wanted a statement in the agreement that I had alleged
that Professor White had engaged in unwanted touching of a sexual
nature.31 Professor White, of course, strenuously objected to the inclusion
of such language. Because I had chosen Miami's informal resolution
procedure, which entailed no finding of sexual harassment, I could not
insist on my language. Thus, the final agreement merely stated that I had
"raised concerns" about Professor White.32
I made my initial request for recusal to my department chairman on
March 3, 1997. 33 When I first requested Professor White's recusal from my
P&T Committee, I was unaware that the finance department had an
"absence equals a no vote" rule. Thus, by agreeing to recuse himself,
Professor White guaranteed that I would receive at least one negative vote
on my promotion and tenure decision. Not until two and half weeks later,
at a meeting held at the DAA on the subject of recusal did I learn of the
finance department's unusual rule.34  Had I been apprised of the
departmental rule earlier, I would have "sought different terms for the
resolution" of my problem with Professor White.35 When I learned of the
rule from my department chairman, I insisted that the recusal agreement
29. See Continuing Journal of Events, at 1 1 (April 1, 1997, 20:47 EST) [hereinafter
Continuing Journal] (on file with author).
30. Id.
31. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at app. D 2.
32. See Memorandum of Agreement, April 2, 1997, in Formal Complaint, supra note
13, at App. G 2.B [hereinafter Recusal Agreement].
33. See Letter from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Miami Univ., in
Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at app. B.
34. See Continuing Journal, supra note 29, at 2 2.
35. See Recusal Agreement, supra note 32, at 3.
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include language waiving the departmental rule in my case.36 On April 2,
1997, Professor White and I, as well as Professor Green, as chairman of the
finance department, and Professor Lang, as chairman of the P&T
Committee, signed the recusal agreement, which waived the department's
"absence equals a no vote" rule.
37
Two days later, at a finance department meeting, Professor Green
announced that Professor White and his wife would host that year's
departmental party at their home. I could have sent my regrets, but
socializing with my colleagues was an important way to break down the
barriers that existed as a result of my outsider status within the department.
Attending the department's annual party was particularly important that
year, because it would signal a return to business as usual. So, I
complained to both Professor Green and to Rex Knight, the dean of the
business school, about having the party at Professor White's home, but to
no avail. Once again, the university had made no formal finding of sexual
harassment against Professor White, so there was no reason why he could
not host the department's party at his home. 38
At that point, I realized that I had to invoke the university's formal
complaint procedure. A week later, on April 11, 1997, I filed a formal
complaint of sexual harassment against Professor White with the
University's Department of Affirmative Action.
On April 21, 1997, Professor White filed his personal reply to my
formal complaint of sexual harassment:
Ms. Anne M. Lawton, Assistant Professor of Finance, who has
a J.D. and teaches business law courses within the department of
finance, filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment against me
on Friday, April 11, 1997....
Mr. Evans, given your knowledge of this case, you know that I
have gone to the highest extremes to negotiate a settlement with
Ms. Lawton. I wanted a settlement just to finish it, so we could
both get back to work. Yet, Ms. Lawton continues to harrass
[sic] me with her allegations that I engaged in "unwanted"
touching of a sexual nature toward her. This is just not true. The
touching was not unwanted nor unwelcomed, and its nature was
not sexual.
On January 10, 1997, you, Ms. Lawton, and I met in your
office. I was told only the day before the meeting that it involved
you, Ms. Lawton, and me, and we were to discuss some
"workplace issues." Upon hearing the allegations for the first
time during that meeting, I strived to maintain my composure,
36. See id. at 4.,
37. See id.
38. See Memorandum re: Department Party from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin.
Dep't., Miami Univ., April 6, 1997 (on file with author).
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show sensitivity to the concerns raised by Ms. Lawton, and
resolve the matter. At that time, I was not prepared to get into a
debate with Ms. Lawton over what actually happened and who
initiated or encouraged what. I was only concerned with
maintaining a good working relationship with Ms. Lawton. At
the conclusion of the meeting, I was under the impression that we
all agreed that the meeting was to be considered an "educational
exercise," that Ms. Lawton and I would both alter our behavior
toward one another in the workplace, and we agreed that the
meeting would remain confidential. Also, I suggested at the end
of the meeting that she may want me to recuse myself from the
evaluation of her promotion and tenure materials. I made it clear
that whatever she decided was in her best interest, I would gladly
accept. Outside the Affirmative Action Office after the meeting,
I told her I was sorry, and she thanked me for coming to the
meeting.
On Monday, March 31, 1997, I received Ms. Lawton's original
version of the memorandum of agreement (recusal letter) .... As
stated above, during the informal resolution process, I willingly
offered to recuse myself from any decisions concerning her job
evaluations. I thought it was clear that I would cooperate in
removing myself from her promotion and tenure committee, if
she wanted me to do so. It was not necessary for her to take the
extreme measures she did in order to have me recused, unless
there was an underlying motive. I believe that she breached the
confidentiality agreement and violated the spirit of the informal
resolution process.
In her proposed recusal letter dated March 31, 1997, she
wanted the following statement to be read to the members of the
promotion and tenure committee:
In January of this year, Anne Lawton made allegations of
unwanted touching of a sexual nature against Alan White to
the Affirmative Action Office. During an informal process
held in the Affirmative Action Office, Alan White was made
aware of those allegations, which he never denied. Alan
White has agreed to permanently recuse himself from any
current or future consideration of Anne Lawton's promotion
and tenure materials.
In this memorandum of agreement that I received on March 31,
1997, the phrase "unwanted touching of a sexual nature" was
used in connection with this case for the first time. Also, the
phrase, "which he never denied," is a false statement. I thought
these statements were totally inappropriate. I called you shortly
after receiving the memorandum, and told you that I felt the
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phrases were inappropriate, and you agreed with me. I, then,
rewrote Ms. Lawton's memorandum of agreement.... I did omit
the phrase, "which he never denied," and changed the phrase
"made allegations of unwanted touching of a sexual nature
against Alan White," to "raised concerns about Alan." This was
not done to trivialize the concerns raised by Ms. Lawton, but to
maintain the confidentiality of the January 10, 1997, meeting and
to respect the informal resolution process developed by the
University Senate." . . . In retrospect, I believe the original
memorandum prepared by Ms. Lawton was an attempt to coerce
me into signing a document in which I would confess to
allegations that were not true.
Ms. Lawton has twisted and eliminated facts in order to serve
herself.... [I]f this harassment of me by Ms. Lawton and her
advisors does not stop quickly, I no longer want to work here.
My friends, family, and I now stand ready to address each and
every allegation filed by Ms. Lawton and to challenge the process
approved by the University Senate which has been used by Ms.
Lawton to slanderously attack [ ] me....
I engaged in friendly, socially acceptable, professional behavior
toward Ms. Lawton. This is the same kind of behavior that I
exhibit toward my students, colleagues, and friends, regardless of
gender. However, I do appreciate that the January 10, 1997,
meeting was productive in raising my awareness of behaviors
that might be considered inappropriate by some.
There were a few times that Ms. Lawton and I flirted with each
other in an innocent way. The flirtations were not one-sided and
certainly not of a sexual nature on my part and, at the time, I did
not take it to be of a sexual nature on the part of Ms. Lawton....
During our times together, my behavior and treatment of Ms.
Lawton was always consistent with my friendly personality and
never changed from the first day we began working together until
the January meeting in your office. Not once during that period
did Ms. Lawton show any sign whatsoever, either directly or
indirectly, that my behavior made her feel uncomfortable or
threatened. On the contrary, her actions toward me indicated that
she considered me to be her trusted friend and ally. She has used
my friendliness to make a case against me. In my opinion, her
motive is to be promoted and tenured without evaluation.
This reply is to let you know that I will no longer sit by and
allow Ms. Lawton and her advisors to intimidate me [and] my
family [ ] in order to obtain her wishes. She has continually
manipulated the system and used the university process to serve
her purpose at my expense .... I am prepared to file charges
against Ms. Lawton and anyone else who continues to participate
in this harassment and slander.
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Needless to say, my family and I have suffered immensely
throughout this whole ordeal with Ms. Lawton. I trust that you
and the other officers of Miami University will resolve this issue
once and for all within a few days. In the meantime, I pray to
God that Ms. Lawton and I can redevelop a productive,
professional relationship. 9
IV. THE FALLACY OF NEUTRAL RULES
The problem with the current legal framework in sexual harassment
cases is that it looks balanced, fair, and objective. In Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,40 one of the Supreme Court's two affirmative defense cases,
the Court framed the issue of employer liability as balancing the interests
of the "innocent employer" against those of the "innocent employee"
victimized by harassment on the job.4' By doing so, the Court ignored both
the cultural backdrop against which sexual harassment claims are viewed,
as well as the role that the employer plays in creating the hostile work
environment.
First, allegations of harassment often are met with skepticism. 42 The
dominant perception in this culture is that women either lie about
harassment to gain some advantage in the workplace or are overly sensitive
to normal workplace conduct. 43  Either way, the alleged harasser in any
individual case has an automatic advantage: his story resonates with
dominant cultural myths about women's proclivity to lie or their
hypersensitivity to common workplace interactions. As a result, women
who complain about harassment start out with a credibility deficit that they
44must overcome.
Second, sexual harassment does not occur randomly: its predictors are
largely organizational in nature. Harassment is far more likely to occur in
male-dominated workplaces, especially those in which core tasks are
defined as male, and in workplaces in which management condones or
39. Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 1-4 (memorandum headings omitted).
40. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The companion case to Faragher was Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S.742 (1998).
41. Id. at 801. The companion case to Faragher was Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S.742 (1998).
42. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 3, at 97.
43. See generally Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has it Gone Too Far, or
Has the Media?, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 351 (1999) (describing how selective
media accounts of exceptional sexual harassment cases create the impression that claims of
harassment are overblown and reinforce stereotypes that women lie about harassment in
order to obtain advantages at work).
44. See Martha Chamallas, Writing about Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the
Literature, 4 UCLA L. J. 37, 47-49 (1993) (discussing "reasons why women are not
accorded credibility" in sexual harassment cases).
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tolerates harassing conduct.45 Thus, harassment is more likely to occur in
certain workplaces than in others, and it is in precisely these workplaces-
where management tolerates or condones harassing behavior-that
reporting harassment is the most risky.
By ignoring both the cultural myths that disadvantage women in
sexual harassment cases, as well as the structural impediments to reporting
harassment, the Court created powerful, yet invisible, hurdles for victims to
overcome in bringing a sexual harassment case. What is missing from the
legal story about sexual harassment is a recognition and appreciation of the
fact that sexual harassment operates within a power dynamic that privileges
the harasser and disadvantages the victim. As a result, women's voices are
ignored, ridiculed, and silenced, because women's stories about harassment
are not woven into the fabric of the cultural and legal narrative about sexual
harassment.
A. Liars...
Harassers respond to allegations of sexual harassment using
predictable scripts. An all-too-familiar script is that women lie about
harassment in order to use the threat of a sexual harassment lawsuit to
obtain some undeserved benefit at work. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the dominant theme of Professor White's personal reply to my harassment
complaint was that I had lied about the harassment in order to obtain an
advantage in the promotion and tenure process. Professor White claimed
that I had "twisted and eliminated facts" and "continually manipulated the
system and used the university process to serve [my] purpose at [his]
expense.46 My "motive" in doing so was "to be promoted and tenured
without evaluation.
Professor White did not have to look far for confirmation of his belief
that women lie about sexual harassment. Both the university's own policy
and the requirements for bringing a successful sexual harassment lawsuit
support this false perception.
At the time of my complaint, Miami's sexual harassment policy
included a "false claims" provision, which provided that "[a] complainant
found to have knowingly made false allegations of sexual harassment
[would be] subject to University discipline."48 The false claims language
45. See Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3, at 838-841 (explaining how employers with
environments ripe for sexual harassment escape liability if they have a harassment policy
and grievance procedures).
46. Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 3, 4.
47. Id. at 3.
48. MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.2116. The university revised portions of MUPIM
shortly after I had filed my complaint, but retained the false claims provision in the revision.
See Revision to MUPIM §3.6F (1997) [hereinafter REVISED MUPIM] (on file with author).
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immediately followed a statement about retaliation, suggesting that
retaliation against complainants and false complaints of sexual harassment
are equally plausible events. "
The rules crafted by the federal courts in sexual harassment cases also
reinforce this stereotype about women's proclivity to lie. Rather than
focusing on the conduct of the alleged harasser, the federal courts all too
frequently inquire why the complainant either failed to report or delayed
reporting the harassment to her employer. °  The prompt complaint
requirement, borrowed from rape law, serves as one of the law's proxies
for the victim's veracity.51 After all, if the harassment were bad enough,
then why didn't the victim promptly complain---either to the harasser or to
her employer?
5 2
There are two problems with the requirement of prompt complaint.
First, the evidence demonstrates it is an extraordinarily poor proxy for
credibility. The social science research over the past twenty-five years
consistently has shown that women do not report (or delay reporting)
harassment because they fear retaliation, they believe no one will believe
49. See MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.2115 (anti-retaliation provision); id. at §3.2116
(false claims provision); see also REVISED MUPIM, supra note 47, at §3.6E (anti-retaliation
provision), id. at §3.6F (false claims provision).
50. See, e.g., Tatt v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., No. 04-14434, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
8538, at *7 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("And, any belief on her part that she perceived the conduct as
'severe' is undermined by the fact that she failed to report it until she received the adverse
performance evaluation."); Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., 118 F.3d 1134, 1145-46 (7' Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted) ("Novak's alleged sexual harassment was not troubling enough to Gleason
that she bothered to report it to any of her superiors, even though she was given ample
opportunity to do so."); Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, No. 99 CV 4072, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4616, at *23 (E.D. N.Y. March 20, 2003) ("She did not complain of this incident to the
company, though she made other complaints, and she worked with Degenhardt in later years
without further incident."); see also Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 253-60
(noting the inconsistency between a legal standard that depicts formal reporting as the only
reasonable alternative to harassment and the extensive empirical evidence demonstrating
that victims of harassment rarely register formal complaints against their harassers).
51. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 850-51 (1991). Most states have
abandoned the prompt complaint requirement for rape cases. See Michelle J. Anderson, The
Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary
Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REv. 945, 967 (2004) (explaining that
"[m]odern courts rarely require a prompt complaint," but instead "under a modem 'fresh
complaint' doctrine" allow the rape victim to "admit evidence that a complaint was
promptly reported to bolster [her] credibility").
52. See, e.g.,, Hulsey v. Pride Rests., 367 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that plaintiffs failure to complain to her employer did not entitle the employer to summary
judgment, but the employer could raise the issue at trial to show that plaintiff did not
perceive the conduct as severe or pervasive); see also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 813, 850-51 (1991) ("[T]he standard of proof for rape is the law's highest,
permitting no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt; the standard for sexual harassment,
a preponderance of the evidence, is the law's lowest.").
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them, or they think that reporting will make the situation at work worse.53
Second, the sole reason for the prompt complaint requirement is the
unarticulated assumption that without it women will manufacture
complaints of harassment against otherwise "innocent" men. The problem,
however, is that there is no evidence that false complaints of harassment
are a common or serious problem.54 It is true that the perception is that
false claims outnumber legitimate complaints of harassment, but there
simply is an absence of evidence supporting that erroneous perception. "
The prompt complaint requirement surfaced twice during my case.
First, in its findings on my sexual harassment complaint, the DAA
concluded that while I had not complained directly to Professor White, I
had made a "contemporaneous complaint" of harassment by invoking the
university's informal resolution procedure in early January.56 As the
DAA's discussion about the contemporaneousness of my complaint
directly followed an excerpt from the EEOC's policy manual about what
constituted unwelcome conduct, it appeared that my prompt complaint
suggested that Professor White's behavior was unwelcome.57 But, why was
my reaction, and not his behavior, better evidence of the unwelcomeness of
his conduct?
[A]s in rape cases, the focus is on the victim, not on the man. She
may be less powerful, and economically dependent, but she still
is expected to express unwelcomeness. Unless she does, no
burden is placed on him to refrain from abusing his position of
power. A doctor may be required, by tort law, to secure
affirmative and informed assent before he lays his hands on a
woman; but a boss may freely touch any woman subordinate,
until and unless she expresses, through her conduct, her non-
assent.5s
Professor White and I were colleagues, not paramours. Yet, I had to
demonstrate that his conduct, some of which constituted sexual imposition,
a third-degree misdemeanor in Ohio, 9 was unwelcome.
53. See, e.g.,Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 85-92, 126-28, 253, 257-60.
54. See, e.g.,Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 124.
55. Zalesne, supra note 43, at 353 nn. 9-10.
56. See Letter of Findings regarding Anne M. Lawton's formal sexual harassment
complaint against Alan White, April 30, 1997, at 3-4 [hereinafter DAA Findings] (on file
with author).
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Estrich, supra note 51, at 828.
59. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2907.01 (B) (2006) (defining sexual contact as "any
touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the ... buttock...
for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person") Ohio law defines sexual
imposition as "[t]he offender know[ing] that the sexual contact is offensive to the other
person... or is reckless in that regard." OHio REV. CODE ANN. §2907.06(A)(1) (2006).
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Second, Professor White contended that my decision not to confront
him directly meant that I did not consider his behavior offensive. "Ms.
Lawton's contemporaneous responses to Mr. White tell us something about
the severity. She said nothing. Appreciating that Ms. Lawton is an adult
over thirty trained as an advocate, it is difficult to imagine why she would
make no response to gestures that she perceived as truly intimidating. 6 °
Thus, to Professor White, my failure to register a protest directly with him
suggested that I really did not find his behavior offensive.
61
Professor White's interpretation of my behavior, however, took his
harassing conduct out of context. Nowhere did he acknowledge that he
was my supervisor and had power, in part, over my promotion and tenure
decision. Moreover, why was it my responsibility to explain to him what
constituted appropriate workplace behavior? Professor White was an adult
over forty, yet I had to tell him that touching a female colleague on the rear
end and trying to kiss her breached the bounds of acceptable conduct at
work.
Thus, the story told by Professor White played upon pervasive myths
about women's willingness to lie about sexual harassment in order to
obtain advantage. At the same time, it drew upon dominant gender beliefs
that men are "generally more competent at most things than are women. 62
The challenges of the tenure process, for Professor White, were a spur "to
reach [his] fullest potential as a scientist in [his] field., 63 But, according to
Professor White, the rigors of the tenure process required me to lie in order
to obtain tenure, and to treat the demands of my tenured colleagues as a
"personal vendetta." 64 In other words, I was neither competent nor tough
enough to withstand the rigors of the tenure process. My only solution was
to fabricate a story of harassment in order to insulate myself from the
otherwise legitimate critiques of my record during the tenure process.65
60. Response to DAA Findings, supra note 12, at 2 2.
61. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
62. Cecilia L. Ridgeway and Shelley J. Correll, Limiting Inequality through
Interaction: The End(s) of Gender, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 110, 113 (2000).
63. Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 4.
64. Id.
65. My case also arose against the backdrop of a prior tenure denial of another business
law professor, Roger Staton. See Staton v. Miami Univ., No. C-1-95-311 (S.D. Ohio May
14, 1997) (on file with author); see also Staton v. Miami Univ., No. OOAP-410, 2001 WL
289952 (Ohio Ct. App. March 27, 2001). Only months before my arrival on campus,
Professor Staton filed a complaint of sexual harassment against Barbara Lewis, the
department's then Acting Chairwoman, claiming that the university had denied him tenure
because he had rebuffed advances allegedly made by Professor Lewis. Letter from Roger
Staton, March 1, 1994 (on file with author). The university found no reasonable cause to
believe that Professor Lewis had engaged in sexual harassment toward Professor Staton.
Memorandum re: Sexual Harassment Complaint by Roger D. Staton/Letter of Finding from
Bruce Evans, Dir., Dep't. of Affirmative Action, May 13, at 3 (on file with author). It is
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B .. Hysterics...
Back in 1996, a story broke in the national news media about Jonathan
Prevette, a six-year-old boy who was suspended from school after having
given a female classmate a kiss on the cheek. The attention given to the
story by the national news media seemed odd to me, at first.66 While the
primary school administration had overreacted to young Prevette's display
of affection, not every instance of local bureaucratic bungling merits
national news attention. Young Prevette's story did, however, because it
played on an inaccurate but widely held belief that claims of sexual
harassment are exaggerated and overblown.67
Professor White drew on this powerful myth of female oversensitivity
when he described my complaint of harassment as involving a "tasteless
joke" and advised Professor Lang, the chairman of the P&T Committee, to
"leave [his] humor at home. 68 It was possible that Professor White told
this story to no other member of the finance department. I, however, had
no way of knowing to whom he had spoken. Once news got out that I had
been to the DAA, the silence inside the department was deafening.69 It was
clear that there was talk behind closed doors, but no one came to ask me
what had happened.
Moreover, Professor Lang never bothered to ask for my side of the
story. It was merely fortuitous that I learned of Professor White's
comments and was able to address them directly with Professor Lang.70 I
interesting that Professor White started out his personal reply to my harassment complaint
by describing me as an "Assistant Professor of Finance, who has a J.D. and teaches business
law courses within the department of finance." Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 1. It
appears he was trying to draw a parallel sub silentio between my case and the recent
harassment and tenure denial case involving Roger Staton, another business law faculty
member. My status as a professor of business law otherwise bore no relevance to my sexual
harassment complaint.
66. See Deborah Rhode, You Must Remember This, THE NAT'L LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 28,
1996, at Al (noting that "the media predictably had a field day with 'the facts' concerning
Jonathan Prevette"); Scott Baldauf, A Clash Over How To Discipline Sexual Harassment in
Schools, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 7, 1997; Editorial: Odds and Ends,
GREENSBORO NEWS AND RECORD, March 15, 1997. On news stories about whether the law
has gone too far in the area of sexual harassment, see Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes,
supra note 3, at 86 n. 62.
67. See RHODE, supra note 3, at 97; Audrey J. Murrell, Sexual Harassment and Gender
Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 139, 146
(citation omitted).
68. See supra notes 25 and accompanying text.
69. See E-mail from author to Bob Little, Prof., Fin. Dep't., Miami Univ., (April 16,
1997, 07:30:22 EST) (stating that Professor Little was "the only person in this entire
department (besides [my mentor], of course) who has ever said they were sorry this
happened to me or who followed up with me to see if things were going okay") (on file with
author).
70. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 9; Journal of Events, supra note 24, at 10.
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respected Professor Lang, yet he believed a fairly fantastic story woven by
a man who openly admitted that he had been drinking at work on the
weekend. Thus, to Professor Lang, it was more plausible that I had filed a
complaint with the DAA over a single "tasteless joke" than that his finance
department colleague had engaged in workplace sexual harassment.
Unfortunately, the legal standards governing sexual harassment cases
reinforce the widespread myth of female overreaction. In Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court explained that in order for sexual
harassment to be actionable under Title VII, the conduct in question must
be both "objectively and subjectively offensive.",7' The Court noted that in
order to "ensure that Title VII does not become a 'general civility code,"' it
was necessary to "filter out complaints attacking the 'ordinary tribulations
of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, and occasional teasing.'
7 T
By suggesting that its job was to construct a legal standard that
balanced the possibility of overreaction to "trivial slights" against the
possibility of discriminatory workplace harassment, the Court made clear
its belief that harassment and overreaction were equally probable events.
Yet, the research over the past twenty-five years consistently has shown
that "[f]or the vast majority of sex harassment complaints, underreporting,
not overreaction, is the norm., 73  Moreover, in both Faragher and
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,74 amici curiae filed briefs with the Court
that cited to various studies documenting the underreporting problem.75
The Court, on the other hand, had no studies before it nor did it cite to any
evidence indicating that overreaction to normal workday interactions had
become a problem under Title VII. But, by suggesting that overreaction
and underreporting were equally probable consequences of a poorly crafted
legal standard, the Court played into deeply held beliefs that sexual
harassment law could become the legal dumping ground for overly
sensitive, eggshell employees, unused to the "rough and tumble" of the
workplace.76
71. 524 U.S. at 788 (1998) (citations omitted).
72. Id.
73. RHODE, supra note 3, at 99; see Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 208-10
(citing studies).
74. 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
75. Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3, at 859.
76. See Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp.2d 1237, 1250 (M.D.
Ala. 2001) (explaining that an employee cannot "expect the rough and tumble professional
world to completely accommodate his or her private sense of decency, civility, and
morality") (citations omitted).
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C. ...and Persecuted Men
It is becoming more common for men to represent themselves as the
victims of discrimination. The media has fed the perception that women
and minorities hold employers hostage by threatening to sue over
inconsequential slights or well-deserved criticisms of work product. 7  Anti-
discrimination law, of which sexual harassment is a part, is viewed as a
weapon used to secure benefits or advantages to which women and
minority group members are not otherwise entitled. Thus, it is the man
who falls victim to the law's and the institution's willingness to
countenance false or exaggerated claims of sexual harassment by vindictive
or thin-skinned women.
Professor White portrayed himself as the victim in my sexual
harassment case. I had the power and he was the powerless victim. For
example, he considered the recusal letter that I drafted as "an attempt to
coerce [him] into signing a document in which [he] would confess to
allegations that were not true. 78 In his reply to my harassment complaint,
he twice mentioned that I was harassing him. On page one of his reply, he
remarked that "Ms. Lawton continues to harass [sic] me with her
allegations that I engaged in 'unwanted' touching of a 'sexual nature'
toward her."7 9 Later, he once again painted himself as the victim, stating
that he "no longer want[ed] to work" at Miami if "this harrassment [sic] of
me by Ms. Lawton and her advisors does not stop." 80
Moreover, even though approximately 85% of the business school
faculty was white and male, Professor White, like other men within the
business school, saw himself as part of a powerless group. In this "strange,
almost delusional reversal[] of institutional power relations," women and
minorities held the power: they could claim discrimination, thereby holding
the university hostage to their unreasonable demands. Professor White
articulated this fear that the university would make an example of him, as a
white man. 81
Because a federal court suit filed last month accuses the School
of Business Administration of discriminating against women (and
minority men), Mr. White is concerned that there may be unusual
pressure to make an example of a white male business school
professor charged with a form of sexism. Since he has absolutely
no connection with the pending case, he hopes it won't forge any
77. See, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 43, at 358.
78. Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 3.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Linda M. Blum, Tough Times for Feminism, 26 CONTEMP. Soc. 321 (1997).
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connection to him.
Furthermore, it was the university's procedures, according to
Professor White, that disadvantaged him. In his reply to my harassment
complaint, he said that he stood ready "to challenge the process approved
by the University Senate which has been used by Ms. Lawton to
slanderously attack [him]. ' 3
Once again, however, Professor White failed to recognize the
privileged position that he occupied within the university relative to me.
First, the procedures of which he complained afforded him multiple
opportunities to appeal the DAA's findings of fact, a right he would not
have possessed had I prevailed against him in a suit filed in federal district
court. 84
Second, Miami's policy was asymmetrical, affording rights to
Professor White that it denied to me. For example, Professor White
decided not to appeal the DAA's findings. 85 In such a case, Miami's policy
provided that the DAA would "forward its findings to the appropriate vice
president or President's designate for further action of [sic] dismissal of the
charge(s). 86  That meant that the associate provost, who was the
president's designate in my case, could revisit the facts and dismiss the
case against Professor White, even though he had decided not to appeal the
DAA's findings. Yet, had I lost at the DAA and decided not to appeal, my
case would have ended. 87 Thus, Miami's policy provided Professor White
with two avenues for appeal: a de jure appeal, with a hearing before a five-
person hearing committee, and a de facto appeal, the latter of which he
exercised in my case.88
The university's sexual harassment policy also provided protection for
Professor White's reputation, in the event of a false or unsubstantiated
claim of harassment. Miami's policy stated that if "allegations of sexual
harassment are found to be false or are unsubstantiated, reasonable and
necessary steps will be taken by the appropriate University personnel to
restore the reputation of the accused if it is damaged by the complaint
82. Response to DAA Findings, supra note 12, at 3.
83. Personal Reply, supra note 23, at 3.
84. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
85. See Response to DAA Findings, supra note 12, at I (stating that Professor White
did not "wish to request a hearing").
86. MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.2123C.3.
87. An appeal required a hearing before a five-person hearing committee, comprised of
faculty or staff members. See id. at §3.2123E. 1.
88. See generally Response to DAA Findings, supra note 12, at 1 (stating that while
Professor White did not want to appeal, he did want "to address the legal conclusions drawn
in the [DAA's] report"). Professor White also had the right to appeal to the university's
board of trustees any discipline handed down by the President's office; I had no such right.
See MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.2123G.6.
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process."89 The policy provided no such protection for my reputation, even
if the professor involved repeatedly smeared my reputation by lying about
the harassment and impugning my motives in bringing a sexual harassment
claim.90
This asymmetry in the university's policy was not surprising. At
Miami, the university senate voted on changes to the sexual harassment
policy and grievance procedures.9' Faculty members comprise almost two-
thirds of the seats on the senate.92 But, in 1997, women comprised 290/--
less ess than a third-of the faculty members across the entire university;
moreover, they were concentrated in assistant professor positions, which
typically are associated with untenured status.93 This disparity in the
numbers of male versus female faculty members, coupled with the skewed
ratio of men to women in the senior tenured ranks, gave male faculty
members "greater opportunity for shaping university governance
documents, policies, and procedures. 94 Of course, a person's sex does not
necessarily determine his or her perspective on sexual harassment.
Nonetheless, painting in broad strokes, women are far more likely to be
targeted for harassment than are men. 95 Men, on the other hand, worry not
about harassment, but about false claims of harassment. "The procedures
are not neutral; they reflect the interests, concerns, and biases of the most
powerful and influential members of the academic community, who are
overwhelmingly male. 96  Thus, it is not surprising that a policy and
procedure drafted largely by men would provide the alleged harasser with
procedural and substantive protections not afforded to the victim.
Finally, while invisible to him, Professor White's status as a tenured
professor provided him with a shield from adverse university action that
was not available to me. The university could decide not to renew my
89. MUPIM,supra note 21, at §3.2116A; see REVISEDMUPIM,supra note 48, at §3.6F.
90. For a discussion of false claims provisions in university sexual harassment policies,
see Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 124-125.
91. See, e.g., REVISED MUPIM, supra note 48, at § 1.232 (stating that the senate "is the
primary university governance body where students, faculty, and administrators debate
university issues and reach conclusions on the policies and actions to be taken by the
university"); id. at §3.21 et seq. (noting approval by university senate on December 2, 1996,
of changes to sexual harassment policy)
92. Faculty members hold 44 of the 66 senate seats. See MIAMI UNIVERSITY, BYLAWS
OF UNIVERSITY SENATE, §§ 1.B, 2 (July 2006) (on file with author). Seven administrators or
staff members, and fifteen students hold the remaining 22 seats. See id. at §§3A, 4A.
93. There were 209 tenured or tenure-track female faculty members out of 722 tenured
or tenure-track faculty members at Miami University in the fall of 1997. Summary Profile:
Oxford Campus, Oct. 16, 1997 [hereinafter Profile] (on file with author).. Forty-six percent
(96 of 209) of the women were assistant professors. Id.
94. Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 118.
95. See RHODE, supra note 3; Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3..
96. See supra note 3.
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annual contract, or make it difficult for me to secure tenure.97 While there
were procedures available within the university to challenge a tenure denial
and I could always file a claim with the EEOC, I did not have a guaranteed
job.98 Professor White, on the other hand, was guaranteed lifetime
employment with the university, absent malfeasance on his part.99
What is so striking, then, about Professor White's perception is how
contrary it was to reality. He failed to recognize how the university's
structures and procedures provided him with advantages denied to me.
Moreover, while he portrayed himself as victimized and powerless, it was
he who benefited from and drew upon dominant cultural myths about
women's behavior in sexual harassment cases. He used those myths to
cloak himself almost visibly with a presumption of credibility that I had to
overcome.
V. THE UNIVERSITY'S RESPONSE
A. The Credibility Gap
On April 30, 1997, nineteen days after filing my formal complaint, the
DAA found "reasonable cause that Professor Alan White [had] violated
Miami University's Policy Prohibiting Sexual Harassment."'' 00 The DAA
based its conclusion on two factors: the physical nature of the harassment
and Professor White's repeated denials of the allegations.
In determining whether Dr. White's alleged past behavior and his
current behavior constitute a hostile environment for Ms.
Lawton, there are two areas to be examined. First, is that the
alleged behavior was of an unwanted physical nature, i.e., patting
on the rear end and an attempt to kiss Ms. Lawton in an isolated
office area; the other is Dr. White's denial of the allegations.
Both considerations raise the level of concern. Ms. Lawton has
provided credible contemporaneous witnesses on her behalf and
Dr. White has an absence of supportive evidence to his claim of
mutual flirtation. My second concern is with the preponderance
of evidence in clear favor of Ms. Lawton. Dr. White's denial of
97. See infra Part VI.C.
98. Staton v. Miami Univ., No. C-1-95-311, at 4-6 (S.D. Ohio May 14, 1997), affid
Staton v. Miam Univ., No. 97-3592, 1998 WL 228171 (6th Cir. May 1, 1998) (unpublished
decision); see also MIAMI UNIVERSITY POLICY AND INFORMATION MANUAL 2006-2007 §7.9
(stating procedures for faculty member denied tenure or promotion).
99. See MUPIM, supra note 21, at §§3.428, 3.553 (stating that termination of a tenured
faculty member could occur only for "adequate cause" or "fiscal emergencies", and defining
what constitutes cause).
100. DAA Findings, supra note 56, at 4.
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her allegations pushes the alleged conduct to a higher level. It's
one thing to admit to misreading the level of a friendship and
accepting responsibility for the conduct based on one's
misunderstanding; it's quite another to add to the inappropriate
conduct by denial, thus placing the burden on the victim to
endure the offender's unwillingness to accept responsibility for
his own misconduct. It places the victim in a never ending
situation of reliving something that could have been put to rest a
long time ago thus restoring the victim's peace of mind. Making
one whole again is not simply discontinuing the offensive
behavior, but acknowledging the dignity of the victim by taking
responsibility for one's own actions; to do otherwise makes the
work environment hostile.1 '
The DAA's findings were unusual in one respect: the recognition that
the harasser's repeated denials of the conduct perpetuate the harm done by
the initial harassment. But, I believe the DAA's findings are best explained
by the fact that Professor White squandered the presumption of credibility
that he enjoyed going into the process-a presumption based on
stereotypes about women's proclivity to lie about or exaggerate claims of
sexual harassment, 0 2 as well as on Professor White's seven-year, versus
my year-and-a-half, association with the university and his position as a
recently promoted and tenured professor within the university.'0 3
During the course of the informal resolution process and the formal
complaint procedure, Professor White changed his story at least three
different times. At first, he played dumb, suggesting during the informal
resolution process at the DAA that he had "blacked out" at work and did
not remember what had occurred on December 22.
But, shortly after I had filed my formal complaint, he changed his
story and admitted the allegations. On April 15, the Director of the DAA
called to tell me that Professor White was willing to admit that he had
violated the university's sexual harassment policy."° When I asked what
the admission meant, Mr. Evans explained that there was no need for a fact
101. Id.
102. See supra Parts IV.A & IV.B; see also Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual
Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1451, 1453 (1992) (noting that "the majority
of people would simply find it too hard to believe that the high-status person, the person
with so much to lose ... could have behaved in this way. It is much easier to believe the all
too familiar myths about how women behave").
103. See Ross, supra note 102 at 1454 (explaining that "[i]f the leadership believed the
woman, instead of the supervisor, that might suggest that the leaders had poor judgment in
promoting the supervisor, for either they failed to see the inappropriate sexual behavior or
they knew about it and didn't care").
104. See Continuing Journal of Events II, at 1 (April 17, 1997, 18:20:57 EST) (on file
with author).
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finding, which was one of my requested remedies.' °5 He also told me that
Professor White had agreed to counseling with a state-licensed
counselor. 0 6 I asked Mr. Evans whether he would speak with my attorney
Sarah Poston, and he agreed to do so.'0 7 Later that same day, Ms. Poston
contacted me and reiterated what Mr. Evans had already told me-that
Professor White had admitted to violating the university's sexual
harassment policy. 08 I told my mentor Martin Brown and another business
school colleague about the admission. I also mentioned it in an e-mail
response to Karen Smith, who was then Miami University's Provost.10 9
But, only two days later, Professor White changed his story, once
again. On the afternoon of April 17, my attorney informed me that Mr.
Evans had contacted her, because Professor White no longer was admitting
any violation of the university's harassment policy." As a result, Mr.
Evans asked the Provost to extend the time allotted under Miami's policy
for investigating my formal harassment complaint.' Ms. Poston filed an
objection with the Provost's office to the time extension,"' but it was
granted nonetheless, thereby delaying any resolution of my case an
additional nine days." 3  On April 21, Professor White filed his personal
reply to my complaint, in which he categorically denied all of the




108. Letter from Sarah Poston, author's counsel, to Karen Smith, Executive Vice
President for Academic Affairs and Provost, Miami Univ., filed April 17, 1997, with Dep't.
of Affirmative Action, Miami Univ., at 1-2 [hereinafter Objection Letter] (on file with
author).
109. E-mail from author to Karen Smith, Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs
and Provost, Miami Univ. (April 17, 1997, 11:48:25 EST) (on file with author).
110. Objection Letter, supra note 108, at 1-2; see also E-mail from author to Martin
Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (April 18, 1997, 10:56:38 EST)
(stating that Professor White had "'unadmitted it"' and wondering what facts were left to
find given his admission) (on file with author).
111. Memorandum re: Extension of Time Limits from Bruce Evans, Dir., Dep't of
Affirmative Action, Miami Univ., to Karen Smith, Executive Vice President for Academic
Affairs and Provost, Miami Univ., April 17, 1997 (on file with author).
112. See generally Objection Letter, supra note 108.
113. Memorandum re: Request for extension of time to investigate sexual harassment
complaint of Anne Lawton from Karen Smith, Executive Vice President for Academic
Affairs and Provost, Miami Univ., to Bruce Evans, Dir., Dep't of Affirmative Action,
Miami Univ., April 18, 1997 (on file with author).
114. Personal Reply, supra note 23. Professor White changed his story at least two more
times. In his response to the DAA findings, he denied kissing me, but claimed that "he
ha[d] always admitted" most of "all the other lesser acts of which [I] complained").
Response to DAA Findings, supra note 12, at 2, 2. In his response to the university's letter
of reprimand, he admitted to all but the kiss and the affection comment. See Statement of
Alan White Concerning Sexual Harassment Complaint of Anne Lawton, July 2, 1997
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It would have proven difficult for the DAA not to have ruled in my
favor, given the fact that Professor White had admitted the conduct to the
Director of the DAA only days after I had filed my formal complaint.
Regardless of Professor White's subsequent retraction, the Director of the
DAA had to know that, as an attorney, I would appeal any adverse
decision. The university then would have to explain how an admission of
sexual harassment made to a university official, even if later retracted, did
not simply close the case. Thus, I was more fortunate than most victims of
harassment; my harasser frittered away the presumption of credibility that
he enjoyed.
Furthermore, unlike many victims of harassment, I had both the
connections and the legal training necessary to negotiate the university's
complex procedure. As an attorney, I was comfortable dissecting complex
procedures. While I had the resources to hire an attorney, I also saved
money on legal fees by doing first drafts of letters and objections filed with
the university. I also knew a local attorney whom I trusted to represent me
and, as a professional courtesy, her firm agreed to do so at 50% of their
normal hourly rate.
Moreover, prior to invoking the university's informal resolution
process, I confided the details of my case to two very powerful persons
within the school of business, both of whom were witnesses on my behalf
during the formal complaint procedure. The fact that they corroborated my
story lent credibility to my allegations against Professor White. Finally,
many of the persons to whom I turned for advice before initiating the
informal resolution process advised me to report Professor White without
delay. By doing so, neither Professor White nor the university could
undermine my credibility by pointing to a delayed report of harassment.l
5
Consequently, I do not view the DAA's findings as evidence of an
enlightened attitude on the part of university officials nor of an erosion of
the hurdles commonly facing women who report sexual harassment.
Instead, the DAA's findings reflect two facts not necessarily found in most
sexual harassment cases. First, my harasser squandered the presumption of
credibility with which he was cloaked by repeatedly changing his story, in
particular, to the university official responsible for hearing sexual
harassment complaints. Second, I had money, legal skills, and some
powerful connections, all of which helped me to negotiate the university's
labyrinthine procedures and to overcome the credibility deficit with which I
entered the process.
Unfortunately, my victory was short-lived. As I was about to learn,
what the university gave with one hand it took away with the other.
[hereinafter Response to Reprimand] (on file with author).
115. See supra notes 50-52, 56 and accompanying text.
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B. Perilous Procedures
In August of 1995, in Chan v. Miami University,"16 the Ohio Supreme
Court handed Miami a defeat in its attempt to terminate F. Gilbert Chan, a
tenured professor, who had "engaged in both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment" toward a foreign student." 7 The Ohio
Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the university had breached its
contract with Professor Chan by following the procedures for affirmative
action grievances, rather than affording Professor Chan the right to invoke
the university's procedures for termination of tenure. "
8
After Chan, the university's uncertainty about its own procedures and
its concern about being sued once again by a tenured professor caused it to
broadly interpret Professor White's procedural rights under Miami's policy.
Thus, in my case, the associate provost concluded that Professor White had
the right to four levels of appeal within the university, three of which gave
him the right to contest the DAA's findings of fact. "9
Under the Proposed Procedures, in short, Alan White would have
the opportunity to appeal the Department of Affirmative Action's
fact-findings to [the Acting Provost], to the President, to the
Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities, and to the
Board of Trustees. All but the last of these appeal opportunities
allow for a revision of the original fact-findings by the
Department of Affirmative Action. The last two of these appeals,
if Mr. White chooses to take them, could not possibly be
completed before the fall. 20
By affording Professor White multiple opportunities to appeal the
DAA's findings, the university gave Professor White leverage to secure
concessions from me. I wanted the case to be over. The DAA had issued
its findings on April 30, 1997, and by late June, the DAA's findings still
were not final. I was growing tired of the time, energy, and money that I
was expending defending myself. I also did not want the case to drag on
116. 652 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio 1995).
117. Id. at 651 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 646-47.
119. Because I had been friends with Karen Smith, the University's Provost, Dr. Smith
offered to recuse herself from consideration of my case. See Confidential Memorandum re:
Sexual Harassment Complaint of Anne Lawton, from Karen Smith, Provost and Executive
Vice President for Academic Affairs, Miami Univ., to author and Alan White, Assoc. Prof.,
Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., May 16, 1997 (on file with author). Professor White
requested her recusal and, therefore, Dr. Bishop, the Associate Provost, handled the case at
the university level.
120. Letter from Sarah Poston, counsel for author, to James Bishop, Assoc. Vice
President for Academic Affairs and Assoc. Provost, Miami Univ., June 24, 1997, at 2 (on
file with author).
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into the fall of 1997, which the university indicated would happen if
Professor White decided to appeal to the Committee on Faculty Rights and
Responsibilities. But, in order to secure Professor White's agreement not
to appeal further, I had to agree not to appeal the university's discipline-a
brief letter of reprimand placed in Professor White's personnel file.
Anne . . . For your information, I have just received a signed
waiver from Professor White waiving his right to a MUPIM
3.555 hearing should the President accept my recommendation
for a letter of reprimand and should you not file an appeal with
the President concerning the recommendation I've made. The
way is thus open for the President to accept my recommendation
and issue a letter of reprimand thus closing the entire matter.'2
I had several problems with accepting the associate provost's
recommendation that Professor White receive only a reprimand for his
harassing behavior. First, at the last minute, in response to lobbying by
Professor White and his attorney, the university determined that Professor
White had the right to include with his personnel file a statement
responding to the formal reprimand. 122 Section 3.26C of Miami's policy
manual provided that
[i]f any derogatory statements or allegations of unlawful or
criminal conduct should be entered into a staff member's file, the
name of the person making the statement or allegations shall be
included, and the staff member shall be informed at the time of
such entry. If the staff member believes such allegations to be
false, he or she shall have the right to counter them with
statements or documents which shall also be placed in the file. 123
Section 3.26C provided a staff member with the right to counter
121. E-mail from James Bishop, Assoc. Vice President for Academic Affairs and Assoc.
Provost, Miami Univ., to author (July 9, 1997, 10:52:05 EST) (on file with author); see
Memorandum re: Sexual Harassment Complaint of Ms. Anne Lawton against Dr. Alan
White from James Bishop, Assoc. Vice President for Academic Affairs and Assoc. Provost,
Miami Univ., to author, June 17, 1997 [hereinafter Waiver Memo] (on file with author)
(stating that Dr. Bishop wanted to "discuss the feasibility of [my] agreeing to waive further
review/appeal... if Dr. [White] agree[d] to accept [Dr. Bishop's] decision and the Letter of
Reprimand").
122. E-mail from James Bishop, Assoc. Vice President for Academic Affairs and Assoc.
Provost, Miami Univ., to author (July 1, 1997, 14:55:41 EST) (on file with author); compare
Waiver Memo, supra note 121, at Exh. A (containing no notation about Professor White's
right to respond to letter of reprimand) with Memorandum from James Bishop re: Sexual
Harassment Complaint of Anne Lawton Findings and Recommendation to Adam Grant,
President, Miami Univ., July 2, 1997, at Exh. A [hereinafter Provost Recommendation] (on
file with author) (stating that in the event Professor White "elected" to do so, letter of
reprimand should bear a notation that Professor White had filed a "responsive statement to
[the] Letter of Reprimand").
123. MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.26C.
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allegations, but the university interpreted its policy to allow Professor
White the right to respond to university fact-findings, not simply
allegations. The university's interpretation benefited Professor White and
disadvantaged me, once again, even though §3.26C was not even at issue in
Chan. Professor White took advantage of §3.26C; his one-page statement
countering some of the DAA's findings accompanied the three-sentence
letter of reprimand placed in his personnel files.'24
Second, considering the damage done to my reputation by Professor
White's repeated lies, I expected the university to take some action to
restore my reputation. But, university officials obviously believed that they
had no such obligation, as the university's own policy provided protection
only against damage to the reputation of the person accused, not the victim,
of harassment. 125  In addition, even though Professor White eventually
admitted that he had engaged in much of the harassing conduct, both to Mr.
Evans and in writing following the DAA's investigation, the university saw
no reason to sanction him more severely for lying about what had occurred
and for casting aspersions on my character. 126 In fact, by allowing him the
right to place a responsive statement in his personnel file, the university
afforded him a formal mechanism for further besmirching my reputation.
Moreover, when I asked Professor Green to disseminate, in some
fashion to the members of the department, the university's final findings on
my sexual harassment complaint, as a means to quell the lies and rumors
that were circulating, he declined to do so considering any such step to be a
"penalty" imposed on Professor White. 127 Nonetheless, during the DAA's
investigation of my complaint, Professor Green told my mentor that if he
did not stop "campaigning" on my behalf within the department-a charge
that my mentor vehemently denied12--Professor Green would "be forced
to speak to the entire department concerning this situation and disclose all
sides." 1
29
124. See Response to Reprimand, supra note 114; Letter from Adam Grant, President,
Miami Univ., to Alan White, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., July 11,
1997 (on file with author) (stating that the "letter [ ] serve[d] as a formal reprimand for
[Professor White's] violation of Miami University's policy prohibiting sexual harassment").
125. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
127. E-mail from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
author (May 7, 1997, 15:05:13 EST) (on file with author).
128. See E-mail from Martin Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ., to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (April 22, 1997,
09:41:17 EST) [hereinafter Brown Response E-mail] (on file with author) (stating that
Professor Brown had "not been 'campaigning' [and] very much resent[ed] [the]
characterization", having spoken to only one faculty member in the department).
129. E-mail from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
Martin Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Miami Univ. (April 18, 1997, 09:20:33)
[hereinafter Green Threat E-mail] (on file with author).
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Finally, the fact that Professor White stopped touching me after the
January 10, 1997, informal resolution seemed to influence the university's
discipline decision. In his findings and recommendation to the university
president, the associate provost noted that "Dr. White's unwelcome sexual
conduct ceased immediately after the parties' meeting in Mr. Evans' office
on January 10, 1997, in the informal resolution process [and] Ms. Lawton
does not claim that Dr. White has made any further alleged sexual advances
toward her since January 10, 1997." 3° Two sentences later, the associate
provost stated that "[b]ased on the foregoing, I recommend that Dr. White
receive a reprimand for his violation of Miami University's Policy
Prohibiting Sexual Harassment."''
While it was not the sole factor in the discipline decision, the fact that
Professor White "immediately" stopped harassing me played some role in
the token discipline imposed. But, had Professor White slapped me in the
face twice, rather than patting me on the rear end two times, or slugged me
instead of kissing me, would the university have imposed a lighter sanction
simply because he had stopped slapping or slugging me when informed it
was offensive or painful? I doubt it. That is the problem in sexual
harassment cases. Even though Professor White's conduct clearly
breached the acceptable limits of workplace behavior, the assumption was
that until I told Professor White to stop there was no way he could know
his conduct was harmful. Once again, it was my responsibility as a woman
to police the boundaries of my interactions with male employees, both
supervisors and co-workers, rather than their responsibility to keep their
hands to themselves.
In addition, I doubt that Professor White would have received a mere
reprimand, with the right to respond, had he slugged me-or any other
employee-several times at work. The reason for the meager discipline in
my sexual harassment case is that sexual harassment is viewed differently:
if the harassment stops, then the assumption is that there is no harm. But,
the research shows that "sexual harassment, even at relatively low
frequencies, exerts a significant negative impact on women's psychological
well-being and, particularly, job attitudes and work behaviors."'' 3 2 Thus,
stopping the harassment does not wipe clean the slate; the psychological
and work-related harms caused by the harassment remain.
Moreover, had I filed suit against the university, claiming that its
sanctions against Professor White were inadequate, I would have lost. The
130. Provost Recommendation, supra note 122, at 1. The DAA's Findings contain
similar comments. See DAA Findings, supra note 56, at 4.
131. DAA Findings, supra note 56, at 4.
132. Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 401,412(1997).
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federal courts are very deferential to employers in sexual harassment cases,
and rarely examine whether an employer's policy and procedure actually
work in practice 133 or second guess how an employer implements its own
policy, up to and including the sanctions imposed. 34  Therefore, for the
small minority of women, like me, who actually report sexual harassment,
the sanction that the employer imposes is normally the only remedy
available, even if that sanction is woefully inadequate given the conduct
involved.'
Thus, after using the university's informal resolution process,
negotiating a recusal agreement with Professor White, and figuring out the
"ins" and "outs" of the university's formal complaint procedure, I had
"won." All I got for my trouble, however, was a letter of reprimand to
which Professor White was able to respond. Had I known at the outset that
I would waste half a year of my life and spend almost $1,850 in attorney
fees for such a paltry result, I doubt that I would have bothered. But, in the
summer of 1997, I was relieved because the ordeal was finally over. 136 Or,
so I thought.
VI. REPERCUSSIONS AND RETALIATION
A. Moving My Line
In my formal complaint, I asked to have my teaching line moved out
of the finance department.' I had been in the department a mere year and
133. Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 230-35, 239-42; see also Lauren B. Edelman,
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law,
97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1543 (1997) (noting that "[i]n the absence of specific substantive
requirements ... visible symbols of attention to EEO/AA law often suffice as evidence of
compliance").
134. See e.g., Barton v. United Parcel Serv., 175 F. Supp.2d 904, 908 (W.D. Ky. 2001)
(stating, in response to plaintiffis argument that her employer had not disciplined the
harassers sufficiently harshly, that "the focus of... Title VII ... is upon prevention and
cessation of harassment, not punishment of offenders"); see also Grossman, supra note 7, at
720-21 (explaining that the Supreme Court in its affirmative defense sexual harassment
cases "elevated deterrence to the 'primary' goal [of Title VII] and left compensation by the
wayside.").
135. On the reporting problem, see Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 85-
98. Denying victims of harassment the right to compensation also undermines the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which "provided the victims of sex discrimination with the right to
compensatory and punitive damages against private employers-a right that had been
denied them under the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3, at 867
(footnote omitted).
136. Bill from Laufman, Rauh, & Gerhardstein to author, July 26, 1997 (on file with
author); see also RHODE, supra note 3, at 101 (explaining that "[t]he infrequency of serious
sanctions is a major reason for women's reluctance to report abuse").
137. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 4, 3.
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a half before having to file a sexual harassment complaint against one of
my colleagues. Moreover, even after reporting Professor White to the
DAA in January of 1997, he continued to act unprofessionally at work, yet
no one in the department held him accountable.
In March of 1997, I overheard a conversation between a female work-
study student in the finance department and an instructor in the department.
The student was recounting a recent conversation that she had had with
Professor White. Professor White had asked the student, who was 20 years
old, whether she wanted to date a friend of his, who was 34 years old. The
student declined. I asked her whether she felt any pressure to agree to this
date, given her status as a work-study student in the department. She said
"no." Nonetheless, I was concerned. I reported the incident to the
chairman of my department and the Director of the DAA. 35 My chairman
told me that I had overreacted, and explained that he and his wife had asked
students to baby-sit for them. 39 To the best of my knowledge, the DAA
took no action.
Furthermore, the harassment by Professor White was not the first time
I had had an uncomfortable interaction with a member of the department or
witnessed inappropriate behavior by staff or faculty in the department.
During my first year in the department, a colleague stopped by my office to
talk. During that conversation, he rubbed his hand against my cheek. I
stepped backward when he touched me and apparently looked startled. He
responded that I had had face cream on my face and he was simply wiping
it off for me. My mentor told me that this same colleague had commented
on my legs during the departmental meeting at which I was hired.
The unprofessional and inappropriate conduct included racist
behavior, as well. One day I walked into the main finance department
office and one of my colleagues who was white proceeded to recount a
racist joke about the Miss Black America pageant. '40 When I indicated my
discomfort with the joke, my colleague left the office and repeated the joke
in the hallway, thinking that my discomfort stemmed from having the joke
told in a "formal" department office.
On another occasion, some time in the late summer or early fall of
1995, I was in the department's main office copying materials for class.
The chairman of the zoology department came in to introduce Joseph
Arthur, the newest addition to the zoology faculty, to Professor Green, the
finance department chairman. The reason for the visit soon became
138. Id. atapp. J.
139. See Journal of Events, supra note 24, 6.
140. There were no minority tenured or tenure-track faculty members in the finance
department. Minority faculty members, defined as black, American Indian, Asian, or
Hispanic, constituted only 9% (65 of 722) of the entire tenured or tenure-track faculty at
Miami. See Profile, supra note 93.
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apparent. Earlier in the week, one of the finance department secretaries, a
white woman, had contacted campus police after seeing Professor Arthur in
the hall one day. She did so, she claimed, because Professor Arthur, an
African, was carrying no books with him and resembled a drawing of a
black male on a campus alert poster circulated by university police. At that
year's Christmas party, the secretary described the events leading up to the
call to campus police. But, instead of admitting her mistake, she denied
that her conduct was motivated, at all, by race and said that she was never
going to call the campus police again.
Perhaps the most important factor in my decision to request a change
of departmental homes, however, was the fact that my relationship with
Professor Green, the chairman of the finance department, had soured. In
my formal complaint, I described why the informal resolution process had
"been both impractical and unsuccessful.'' Professor Green's failure to
provide me with complete information during the negotiation of the recusal
agreement was a large part of the problem. For example, even though I had
made a written request to Professor Green for Professor White's recusal, I
did not learn about the department's "absence equals a no vote" rule until
two and a half weeks later. 42  Moreover, during the time that I was
negotiating with Professor White about recusing himself from the P&T
Committee, a process in which Professor Green participated, Professor
Green never once mentioned that Professor White was hosting the
department's party, even though that party had been planned three months
earlier. 143
While I described Professor Green's role in the recusal negotiation
process in my formal complaint, I did not allege that he had harassed me.
Thus, the DAA did not provide Professor Green with a copy of my
complaint. Professor White did, however, and Professor Green filed a
seven-page response. 144 At that point, I already had asked for a transfer of
departments, but Professor Green's response to my complaint and his
conduct both during and after the DAA investigation cemented my
conviction that I needed a new departmental home.
In his response to my formal complaint, Professor Green lied. He said
that while my formal complaint "list[ed] four specific incidents that
occurred between [me] and Professor White . . . [a]t no point [had I] ever
inform[ed] [him], the Chairman of the Finance Department, of these
141. Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 3. MUPIM provided that "[w]hen informal
resolution is impractical or unsuccessful, individuals are urged to employ the available
formal mechanism." MUPIM, supra note 21, at §3.2123.
142. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
143. Memorandum re: Formal Complaint of Professor Lawton from John Green,
Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to Bruce Evans, Dir., Dep't. of
Affirmative Action, Miami Univ.,filed April 21, 1997, at 6-7 (on file with author).
144. Id. at 1.
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occurrences.' 45 Yet, on the morning of January 10, before the informal
resolution process at the DAA, Professor Green called me into his office,
because Professor White had contacted him about the DAA meeting. 146 I
told Professor Green what had happened and he remarked that I had done
the right thing in reporting it to Bruce Evans at the DAA.
Moreover, Professor Green interfered during the DAA's investigation,
using his position as department chairman to threaten at least one of my
witnesses. 47  On April 18, only one day after receiving a copy of my
formal complaint from Professor White, Professor Green e-mailed Martin
Brown, my finance department mentor, claiming that Professor Brown had
discussed the case with members of the department, thereby "violating the
spirit of any confidentiality agreement."'14  Even though the DAA's
investigation was underway at that point, Professor Green told Professor
Brown that if he did not stop talking with other members of the department
about my case, Professor Green would "be forced to speak to the entire
department concerning this situation and disclose all sides.' 49 Professor
Brown's response-that Professor Green had lost his "objectivity and was
becoming defensive"-had merit; Professor Green's e-mail followed on the
heels of his getting a copy of my formal complaint in which I had
complained about his failure to provide me with complete information
during the recusal negotiation process. "0 While my formal complaint
described Professor White's lies to Professor Lang about the informal
resolution process, Professor Green did not cite Professor White's
misrepresentations as reason to "disclose all sides." ' Furthermore,
because Professor Green directed this threat at my mentor, who he claimed
had been campaigning on my behalf, it is likely that "disclos[ing] all sides"
meant providing Professor White, not me, with a platform for
disseminating his story. Thus, Professor Green chose to align his interests
145. Id. at 2.
146. Handwritten Journal, at 12 (on file with author); Facsimile from author to Sarah
Poston, counsel for author, at 2 (April 21, 1997, 09:48 EST) (showing handwritten
comments on Chairman's Response) (on file with author).
147. I subsequently learned that during the investigation Professor Green also confronted
Professor Cassidy, another one of my witnesses. See Continuing Journal of Events III, at 1
(May 20, 1997, 16:42:37 EST) (on file with author). Professor Cassidy did not disclose the
substance of her conversation with Professor Green, but indicated that Professor Green was
angry. See id. Both Professor Cassidy, a tenured member of the Decision Sciences/MIS
faculty, and Professor Brown were listed as witnesses on my sexual harassment complaint.
See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at app. A.
148. Green Threat E-mail, supra note 129.
149. Id.
150. E-mail from Martin Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (April 22, 1997, 09:41:17
EST) (on file with author)
151. See Formal Complaint, supra note 13, at 9.
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with those of Professor White-protecting Professor White's right to
misrepresent what occurred during the informal resolution process while
binding me to some vague "spirit of confidentiality."' 52
But, what was most telling was Professor Green's response to my
request to call the department together to read the results of the DAA's
investigation. He refused to do so, even though he had been willing to
"disclose all sides" during the pendency of the DAA's investigation, when
there were no official findings of fact, only allegations. 53 Moreover, even
though Professor Green refused my request, he warned Professor White
that I had made such a request, precipitating a flurry of phone calls by
Professor White to various faculty members on the witness list attached to
my formal complaint.
15 4
Thus, it is not surprising that by the spring of 1997, I was ready to
change departments. The DAA, however, expressed no opinion on my
request for a new departmental home, arguing that it was a "curriculum and
personnel issue" better left to the business school, and the Provost's and
President's offices. 55 As a result, there was no formal mechanism in place
for me to obtain the relief that was necessary. But, with the assistance of
my mentor and sympathetic faculty members within the department of
management, I negotiated a transfer out of the finance department and
began teaching in the management department in September of 1997.156
B. Plausible Deniability
The university would not accept my move to the management
department premised on my sexual harassment experience. Therefore, my
mentor and I, along with the chairman of the management department,
packaged the move as a curricular one, based on a business legal studies
program proposal that my mentor had floated three years earlier in 1994.157
152. See Brown Response E-mail, supra note 128 (noting that "the spirit of
confidentiality"... ha[d] been breached weeks ago by many of the parties involved").
153. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
154. E-mail from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ. (May 8, 1997, 11:52:30 EST) (on file with author); see also Cassidy Statement, supra
note 25; E-mail from Martin Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
Alan White, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (May 8, 1997, 09:38:36
EST) (on file with author).
155. DAA Findings, supra note 56, at 5.
156. E-mail from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
Members, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (Aug. 12, 1997, 09:53:30 EST)
[hereinafter Move E-mail] (on file with author).
157. 1994 Draft Business Legal Studies Program Proposal (on file with author); see also
Memorandum re: Summary of April 21, 1997 Meeting from author to Rex Knight, Dean,
Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., Kevin Black, Chairman, Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ., and Martin Brown, Assoc. Prof., Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., May 9, 1997
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This solution, however, ignored the organizational context which
necessitated my move in the first instance. Disguising the reason for my
change of departments reinforced the impression that my sexual harassment
case was an aberration, rather than a symptom of a broader pattern of overt
and, at times, unconscious sexism that characterized the dominant culture
within the business school.
It also allowed the university to portray the move as a choice freely
undertaken, thereby placing on me the burden of unforeseen contingencies,
such as a change in the criteria for raises. Furthermore, concealing the real
reason behind the move of my departmental home meant that the university
could attribute adverse consequences that I suffered as a result of the move
to honest mistakes or bureaucratic bungling, rather than to retaliation.
1. The Chilly Climate
The research on sexual harassment demonstrates that organizational
factors, not individual ones, predict the incidence of harassment within the
workplace.'58 Thus, harassment is more likely to occur in workplaces with
male identified occupations, a skewed ratio of men to women, and a culture
tolerant of harassing workplace conduct. 5 9
While I was at the business school, women comprised approximately
15% of the tenured or tenure-track faculty. Both hiring patterns and
retention problems exacerbated the disparity in numbers of male versus
female professors. Over a fourteen-year period, from 1982 through 1995,
the business school hired 80 assistant professors, 23 of whom were female,
for a hiring rate for female faculty members of 29%. 160 The "market" could
be blamed for the differential hiring rates within the business school,
because fewer women earn Ph.D.'s in business than in the arts and
humanities.' But, the "market" could not account for the differences in
tenure rates between male and female faculty members. While 73% of men
hired into tenure-track positions earned tenure in the business school, only
(outlining process for and curricular advantages of move); Move E-mail, supra note 156
(informing finance department that my move to management "was made on academic
grounds to support interdisciplinary efforts").
158. See Lawton, Bad Apple, supra note 3, at 838-841 (noting that "social science
researchers consistently have found that organizational factors play an influential, if not
determinative, role in the occurrence of sexual harassment in the workplace").
159. Idat839-41.
160. Information on Hiring and Retention of Tenure Track Faculty by Gender, Miami
Univ., tbl. I, May 2, 1996 [hereinafter Hiring Information] (on file with author).
161. In 1994, men earned 71.6% and women 28.4% of doctorates in business and
management. In the same year men earned 52.3% and women 47.7% of doctorates in the
arts and humanities. Fact Files: Who Got Doctorates from U.S. Universities, CHRON. OF
HIGHEREDUC., Dec. 8, 1995, at A18.
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44% of women did so. 162 Part of the explanation for the differential rates
was that a higher percentage of women (38%) left the business school
before their tenure yearthan did men (21%).163 The retention problem,
while more pronounced at the business school, was not unique to it. A
1996 study of hiring and tenure rates by then Provost Karen Smith found
that "females are less likely to be tenured than males and more females
proportionately leave Miami University than males before the point of the
tenure decision."164
The low hiring and tenure rates were not surprising given the attitudes
of some male faculty members within the business school. For example, a
male full professor in the business school, upon receiving the form to
evaluate Provost Karen Smith remarked "Let's rape the bitch."'165 When
Ellen Hope, an associate professor in the economics department,
"commented on an article about the shortage of women professors, one
professor said that was from the 'good old days when women chose not to
become professors. ,,1
66
During my first year at the business school, I asked Edgar Lewis, a
professor in Decision Sciences/MIS, to help me to design an exercise for
my business law students. In the exercise, the students played managers
responsible for allocating raises among male and female employees of
different races. The goal of the exercise was to determine whether the sex
and/or race of the employee unconsciously influenced the students' pay
decisions. When I explained to Professor Lewis the purpose of the
exercise, he remarked that there were some jobs that women could not
perform.
This chilly climate faced by female faculty within the school of
business explained the retention problem. A university-sponsored study
conducted in 1999 at the business school found that "there [was] 'no broad-
based support of diversity among faculty/[administration,] and some
evidence of clear resistance."' 167 In quantitative departments, in which men
predominated and the skill set was considered "male", 68 the resistance
162. See Hiring Information, supra note 160, at tbl. II.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1.
165. E-mail from author to Rex Knight, Dean, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. (April 4, 1997,
13:37:36) (on file with author).
166. Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Li's, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment at 24, Li v. Miami Univ., No. C-1-97-395 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter
Li Opposition Memorandum] (on file with author).
167. Id.
168. See Shelley J. Correll, Gender and the Career Choice Process: The Role of Biased
Self-Assessments, 106 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1691, 1711 (2001) (finding that "males are more
likely to perceive that they are good at math than are those females with equal math grades
and test scores").
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often was overt. For example, a professor in the economics department
told Professor Hope that "women did not major in economics because they
'aren't analytical."" 69  George Beck, the ex-chairman of the economics
department, "shouted out in the hall that women are 'lousy researchers."" 7
A full professor in the department left in Professor Hope's mailbox a
passage about villagers' auctioning off "girls of marriageable age." The
passage recounted how the rich men bid on the prettiest girls, "while the
humbler folk . . . were actually paid to take the ugly ones, [with] the
auctioneer ... call[ing] upon the plainest, or even perhaps a crippled one,
to stand up, and then ask[ing] who was willing to take the least money to
marry her."'
171
Professor Beck did not limit his offensive behavior to the confines of
the economics department. One day, after I had moved to the management
department, he sat down at a table I was occupying in the faculty lounge. I
barely knew him, but Professor Beck began by saying that he had heard of
my sexual harassment case and did not want me to be wary of associating
with male faculty members. He then invited me to go to a concert and
perhaps dinner, an invitation which I declined once I realized his wife was
not to accompany us.
Thus, for many women, coming to work at the business school meant
running a gauntlet of sexist and offensive comments, and fending off
physical assault. The harassment, both sexual and sexist, served an
important function: it "police[d] the boundaries of the work and protect[ed]
its idealized masculine image-as well as the identity of those who [did]
it."' 17 2 Many men in the business school, however, dismissed the problem,
because they failed to see the pattern of behavior and its impact on the
well-being and, therefore, retention of female faculty members.
1 73
2. Putting Out Fires
During my third year at Miami-my first in the management
department-I spent a good deal of time addressing problems resulting
from the transfer of departments. Issues with my salary proved the most
significant.
169. Li Opposition Memorandum, supra note 166, at 24.
170. Id.
171. E-mail from Ellen Hope, Assoc. Prof., Econ. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ. to
author (Feb 28, 1997, 15:24:53 EST) (on file with author).
172. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1691
(1998).
173. See Li Opposition Memorandum, supra note 166, at 27-28 (detailing deposition
testimony of Professor Rebecca Luzadis, who found the work environment so inhospitable
that "she took a year off from work, to get away from her job"). Professor Hope left the
university several years after earning tenure.
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At the end of my first year in the management department, I received
the lowest raise, both in absolute dollars and percentage of salary, which I
had received in the three years that I had been at Miami. I had had a very
productive year-good teaching evaluations, acceptance for publication of
an article by a teaching periodical put out by the Academy of Legal Studies
in Business, and an "Outstanding Paper" award at a regional business law
conference for another work in progress. 7 4 Scholarly activity supposedly
counted for forty percent of the annual raise. Yet, I received only a 2.75%
merit raise and no money for what the university called "salary
improvement."' 175 At the same time, my mentor received a 3.88% merit
raise and David Hogan, the other business law professor, received a 2.69%
merit raise; neither had published during the 1997-1998 academic year, as
had 1.176 Adding in salary improvement, which both Professors Hogan and
Brown received, their raises were 6.27% and 6.42%, respectively,
compared to my 2.75% raise.
Moreover, during my time in the finance department, I had closed to
only $1,000 (from $3,400) the gap in salary between myself and Professor
Hogan. Professor Hogan was a tenured associate professor and I was only
an untenured assistant professor, but Professor Hogan had never published
a law review article; in fact, during my five years at Miami, he published
nothing at all and did not present scholarly work at a single professional
meeting. 177  By my third year at Miami, I already had published two
articles, one a law review article and the other a pedagogical piece, and was
working on a third. I anticipated closing the salary gap between Professor
Hogan and myself if I continued to publish, but after my first year in the
management department, the gap between his and my salary increased from
$1,000 to $1719.178
174. I subsequently published in the KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL the article that received
the Outstanding Paper Award. Anne Lawton, The Frankenstein Controversy: The
Constitutionality of a Federal Ban on Cloning, 87 KENTUCKY L.J. 277 (1998-99).
175. Memorandum re: 1998-99 Salary Recommendations for Assistant, Associate and
Full Professors from Kevin Black, Chairman, Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
author, May 15, 1998, at 2 (on file with author).
176. See Salary Table (on file with author). I obtained the salary figures through a public
records request to Miami University. See Letter from author to Melissa Wright, Gen.
Counsel, Miami Univ., March 13, 1999 (on file with author). The Department of Finance,
Miami University, Annual Report 1998, at 4-5 (listing publications) (on file with author);
The Department of Finance, Miami University, Annual Report 1997, at 5 (same).
177. See supra note 176; see also The Department of Finance, Miami University, Annual
Report 1999, at 2-4 (listing publications and presentations at professional meetings) (on file
with author); The Department of Finance, Miami University, Annual Report 1996, at 4-6
(same); The Department of Finance, Miami University, Annual Report 1995, at 6-8 (same).
178. Originally, the gap increased from $1,000 to $2993. After registering a complaint
with both Professors Black and Dean Knight, the difference between Professor Hogan's
salary and mine was $1719.
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I came to realize that the reason for the difference in raises was that
the members of the management department, on the whole, were simply
more productive scholars than the members of the finance department. By
changing departments, I had changed comparison groups to my detriment.
I had not realized that fact when I requested the change of departmental
homes.
I raised with both Professor Black, the chairman of the management
department, and the dean the concerns about my salary. The dean's
response to my salary complaints, however, missed the mark.
Last year, when you requested to move to the management
department, I asked you to discuss P&T and annual evaluation
procedures within the department to be sure you were
comfortable. At that time, you assured me that you were. In our
most recent meeting, you indicated that you did not fully
understand the procedures because you felt you had no real
option other than moving to the management department.
Because of this new concern, I reviewed salary adjustments in
both departments. 179
This description of the process ignored the context in which my change of
departments had occurred. I had not suddenly decided that for curricular
reasons it made sense to change departments in the third year of my tenure
at Miami; sexual harassment and the deteriorating relationship with my ex-
chairman necessitated the move. If I wanted to stay at Miami, I had no
choice but to change departmental homes. Thus, it was simply
disingenuous to suggest that my lack of options constituted a "new
concern."
Nonetheless, my salary complaints did bear some fruit. Professor
Black increased my salary for the 1998-99 academic year; with merit and
salary adjustment monies, I received a 5.1% raise. While Professor Black
agreed to "consider the compensation of others teaching business law" in
the business school, he would not consider the "productivity of Finance
Department faculty" in raise recommendations. 80 Thus, my modified raise
left open the internal equity issue. The dean's response that it was
"impossible to accurately determine a hypothetical salary if you had
remained in finance," once again, missed the mark.18' Had I remained in
the finance department, Professor Green would have had a difficult time
179. Memorandum re: Your E-mails from Rex Knight, Dean, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ.,
to author, July 15, 1998, at 1, i [hereinafter Dean E-mail Memo] (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
180. Memorandum re: Your pay for the 1998-99 Academic year and beyond from Kevin
Black, Chairman, Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to author, June 30, 1998, at 3
(on file with author).
181. Dean E-mail Memo, supra note 179, at 2.
2007]
644 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:3
justifying giving me a lower raise than the two male business law faculty
members when I had published and they had not done so during the
relevant academic year. Yet, the dean was unwilling to recognize this fact,
because the university was unwilling to acknowledge that sexual
harassment had necessitated my change of departmental homes.
I did not view my salary problem as evidence of retaliation. Instead, I
considered it to be an unforeseen consequence of my move to the
management department which the university and business school proved
unwilling to fully address. Other problems that I encountered, such as the
loss of the dean's comments on my second-year review and certain
scheduling issues, however, were less easy to explain and more suggestive
of retaliation.
First, when I changed departments, my promotion and tenure file,
complete with my first two annual reviews, moved with me. While
reviewing the file for my third-year review, Professor Black discovered that
the dean's comments on my second-year review were missing. 82 In May
of 1998, a year after he originally had commented on my second-year
review, the dean reconstructed his earlier comments for my file. 3 He
"remember[ed] seeing the second year report" and commented that it was
"unclear why an endorsed copy [was] not in [my] file."'8' 4
Later, however, after I had complained about possible retaliation by
Professor Green, the dean attributed the loss of his comments on my
second-year review to what he described as "a fairly complex process,"
involving three levels of review-by the department, the dean, and the
provost. 185 But, at that time at Miami, the second-year review entailed
nothing more than a departmental, followed by a decanal, review; the
provost's office did not provide comments until the faculty member's third
year. Moreover, I was the only untenured faculty member in finance;
therefore, the department was not managing comments and reviews on
multiple faculty members at different stages of the tenure process. Thus, it
is unclear what made the process so complex.
Second, when I moved departments, the university left my course
scheduling in the hands of the finance department. As a result, I straddled
two departments, with my course selection and scheduling remaining in
finance, but my promotion and tenure decision moving over to
management. Decisions on both issues-course scheduling and priority, as
well as salary-always redounded to my detriment. For example, even
182. Memorandum For the Files from Rex Knight, Dean, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ.,
May 8, 1998 (on file with author).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Letter from Rex Knight, Dean, Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to author, July 7, 1998,
at 1, 3 [hereinafter Retaliation Response] (on file with author).
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though I continued to teach what were identified as finance department
courses, I was taken off the summer teaching priority system for finance
courses; only after registering a complaint with Professor Green was I
placed back on the normal rotation.
186
Furthermore, when I moved to the management department, Professor
Green stopped providing me with the course preference sheet that each
member of the finance department received prior to his preparation of the
following year's draft academic schedule. Therefore, he prepared the draft
schedule for the 1998-99 academic year without any input from me about
the courses and times that I preferred teaching.'87 As a result, I was not
listed on the initial draft schedule for the fall term 1998, and for spring term
1999 was scheduled to teach three sections of the required business law
course-a less favorable teaching assignment. 188 I sent Professor Green an
e-mail objecting to teaching three sections of the required course, but
received no response.'89 The only other time that I had had to teach three
sections of the required course was in my first semester at Miami, before I
arrived at the university and could provide input on my teaching
preferences. Furthermore, Professor Green assigned only one section each
of the required course to the two male long-term visiting professors for the
spring term 1999.190
Professor Green also gave preference to one of the male long-term
visiting professors over me, a tenure-track professor, in scheduling. For the
fall term 1997, I had asked for, and secured, a two-day per week teaching
schedule with 75-minute, rather than 50-minute, classes. I made the
request in order to secure more days and larger blocks of time for writing.
Unfortunately, I had to teach my three 75-minute courses, back-to-back,
from 3:00 to 7:15 p.m., which was not ideal. I also requested a two-day
186. E-mail from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ. (Mar. 1, 1999, 10:15 EST) (on file with author). Memorandum re: Summer Teaching
from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to author, April 26,
1999 (on file with author).
187. E-mail from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ. (January 13, 1998, 07:46:10 EST) [hereinafter Scheduling E-mail] (on file with
author).
188. Memorandum re: Misc from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Miami Univ., to
Dep't. of Fin., January 12, 1998, [hereinafter Draft 98-99 Schedule] (on file with author).
Even though I no longer was a member of the finance department and my office now was
housed in a different building, Professor Green left the draft schedule in my old mailbox in
the finance department and did not bother to e-mail me to let me know it was there. See
Scheduling E-mail, supra note 187.
189. Scheduling E-mail, supra note 187; E-mail from author to Rex Knight, Dean, Sch.
of Bus., Miami Univ. (May 6, 1998, 15:50:39) [hereinafter Retaliation E-mail] (on file with
author).
190. See Scheduling E-mail, supra note 187. In the fall term, when each visitor taught
only two sections, one taught two upper-level courses and the other taught only one section
of the required course. See Draft 98-99 Schedule, supra note 188.
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schedule for spring term 1998, which Professor Green accommodated.
But, instead of giving me the two-day schedule ending at 4:45 p.m., which
one of the male visiting professors merited for the entire 1997-98 academic
year, I had to teach from 3:00 until 7:15 p.m. I suggested to Professor
Green that he switch me into the visitor's time slots; after all, I was a
tenure-track faculty member and, therefore, "should get priority" over a
visitor.1 9' He declined to do so. 92
Individually, each of these problems appears trivial. But, taken
together, a pattern of questionable behavior emerged. After my transfer to
management, the finance department retained authority over only my
teaching schedule. Yet, whenever possible, that authority was exercised to
my disadvantage: removing me from the summer teaching rotation, failing
to provide me with the course selection preference sheet, allowing visitors
to teach upper-level electives while relegating me to teaching three sections
of the required course, and giving more favorable teaching times to visiting
professors. Moreover, the scheduling issues did not arise in a vacuum.
The finance department had lost the dean's comments on my second-year
review, and Professor Green, on more than one occasion, had used his
position as department chairman to my disadvantage. 193
I complained about Professor Green's conduct to Dean Knight, who
made it abundantly clear that he did "not believe that [Professor Green]
ha[d] retaliated against [me.]' 94 Dean Knight explained away each incident
of alleged retaliation, some more convincingly than others, but failed to
address the overall pattern of conduct.' 95 His responses to my allegations
reveal the deficiencies of retaliation law, and demonstrate how the law's
shortcomings create few incentives for organizations to deal effectively
with retaliation complaints.
First, a complaint of sexual harassment often triggers retaliation.
96
The research demonstrates that in both unionized and non-unionized firms
organizations punish employees who file grievances against their
supervisors. 97  "Specifically, supervisors seem to react negatively to
191. E-mail from author to John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ. (Nov. 14, 1997, 13:11:17) (on file with author).
192. E-mail from John Green, Chairman, Fin. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to
author (Nov. 14, 1997, 14:10:06) (on file with author). The management department found
available classrooms so that I could teach two days per week and end at 4:45 p.m. See E-
mail from Michael King, Prof., Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to author (Nov.
19, 1997, 11:31:59) (on file with author).
193. See, e.g., supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
194. See Retaliation Response, supra note 185, at 2.
195. Id.
196. Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 126.
197. See Peterson & Lewin, supra note 10, at 401 (explaining that "grievants had lower
job performance ratings, promotion rates, and work attendance rates and higher voluntary
and involuntary turnover rates than did non-grievants in the periods following grievance
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employees who file grievances . . .especially when those grievances are
decided in favor of the employee. '" gs Therefore, a claim of sexual
harassment against a supervisor likely will result in some form of
retaliation, in particular, in situations in which the grievant prevails, as in
my case.
Yet, the law presumes objectivity on the part of organizational
supervisors.' 99 Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the elements
of a retaliation claim, even if she has proven successful in pursuing her
claim of sexual harassment through her employer's internal grievance
machinery. By permitting employers to engage in this deceit of objectivity,
the law privileges the supervisor's account of alleged retaliatory conduct
over that of the employee. As a result, even if the employee decides to file
yet another grievance, this time for retaliation, she enters the process with a
presumption that retaliation has not occurred, notwithstanding significant
empirical evidence to the contrary.200
This privileging of the supervisor's story comports with the natural
tendency of organizational managers to side with one another in a dispute
with a subordinate. Professor Green was one of six department chairmen in
the business school and, as such, worked more closely with the
administration than I. Moreover, his behavior, if retaliatory, subjected the
university to liability. No doubt the dean and other administrators worried
that I might sue and use any admission of retaliation against the university.
Thus, the university adopted an interim strategy, one which would
have insulated them from legal liability, given the state of Sixth Circuit
precedent at the time.20' The university refused to acknowledge that any of
filing and settlement"); Klaas & DeNisi, supra note 7, at 713-15 (finding that supervisors
gave lower performance ratings to employees who had filed grievances against the
supervisor, in particular if the employee prevailed on the grievance); David Lewin, Dispute
Resolution in the Nonunion Firm: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 31 J. CONFLICT
REs. 465, 499 (1987) (concluding that "the empirical evidence presented here lends some
support to an organizational punishment-industrial discipline perspective on workplace
dispute resolution").
198. Klaas & DeNisi, supra note 7, at 713.
199. See Lawton, Empirical Vacuum, supra note 3, at 264-66 (discussing hypothetical
based on facts of Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000)).
200. See Lawton, Emperor's New Clothes, supra note 3, at 145 (suggesting that, at a
minimum, if a victim of harassment uses her employer's grievance procedure and prevails,
then a presumption of retaliation should attach in any subsequent internal retaliation
proceeding when the victim alleges particular types of behavior, such as a negative
performance review).
201. See Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that female professor had not "suffered a final or lasting adverse employment
action sufficient to create a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII",
because the university had reversed the initial denial of tenure and awarded her back pay),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000). Dobbs-Weinstein was not a retaliation case.
Subsequently, in White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., the Sixth Circuit adopted the
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Professor Green's conduct constituted retaliation, yet it addressed many of
my complaints of retaliation. For example, the management department
took over the scheduling of my courses, and the finance department voted
to put me back on the normal summer teaching rotation. 202 The problem
with this solution, however, is that it ignored the purpose of Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision.
As the Supreme Court recently noted in Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,20 3 the "anti-retaliation provision seeks to
prevent employer interference with 'unfettered access' to Title VII's
remedial mechanisms. '2 °  In Burlington Northern, Sheila White, who
previously had won an internal sexual harassment grievance against her
supervisor, alleged that a 37-day suspension without pay constituted
retaliation.20 5 The Court concluded that the suspension was a materially
adverse employment action, a required element in a retaliation claim, even
though the firm subsequently reinstated White with back pay.20 6
A reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining her
job (and paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint might
well choose the former. That is to say, an indefinite suspension
without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the suspended
employee eventually received backpay. °7
Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the employer cures
retaliatory conduct, but whether the retaliatory conduct would chill a
reasonable employee's exercise of her rights under Title VII. Such an
approach makes sense, so long as the lower federal courts do not limit its
application to unpaid suspensions or similarly egregious acts of employer
retaliation. After all, if the law allowed employers to escape liability for
retaliation by subsequently curing the retaliation, few employees would
dare to complain about Title VII violations, because curing the retaliation
does not make the victim whole. She has expended time, energy, and effort
fighting the retaliation, all of which make her job more stressful and
rationale of Dobbs-Weinstein in a retaliation case, concluding that the company's 37-day
suspension without pay did not constitute an adverse employment action, because the
company had reinstated White and awarded her backpay. 310 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002). In
2005, however, the Sixth Circuit retreated from its earlier position, holding that a "thirty-
seven day suspension without pay constitutes an adverse employment action regardless of
whether the suspension is followed by a reinstatement with back pay. White v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 791 (2005) (en banc), affd, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
202. See Retaliation E-mail, supra note 189, at 2 (noting that Michael King of the
management department had taken over the scheduling of my courses).
203. 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
204. Id. at 2415 (2006). (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 2409.
206. Id. at 2415-18.
207. Id. at 2417 (citation omitted).
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challenging than that of similarly situated colleagues.
Second, by disaggregating my claims of retaliation from the whole,
Dean Knight changed the context in which the conduct occurred. The
inquiry in retaliation cases should focus on whether the employer's conduct
in the aggregate is "likely 'to deter victims of discrimination from
complaining to the EEOC,' the courts, and their employers. 2 s Therefore,
university administrators should have asked how my experience in the
aggregate affected other women's willingness to complain about workplace
harassment at the business school. How many women would complain
about harassment if doing so alienated the chairman of their department,
thereby requiring a change of departmental homes midway through their
tenure track, affected their ability to get good teaching schedules and
summer teaching assignments, and adversely affected their ability to obtain
tenure?20 9
But, the university's response to my complaints was not surprising
given the legal framework in retaliation cases. For example, some federal
courts compartmentalize the retaliation analysis, deciding whether each
allegation of retaliatory conduct, standing alone, constitutes an adverse
employment action. ° Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Burlington Northern provides no assurance that those lower federal
courts inclined to disaggregate incidents of retaliation will not continue to
do so.
Burlington Northern involved two acts of retaliation-reassignment of
job duties and a 37-day suspension without pay. After determining that a
Title VII retaliation claim requires that the employer's conduct be
"materially adverse," the Court analyzed the two acts of retaliation
separately, concluding that each was materially adverse. 21 ' Nowhere did
208. Id. (citation omitted).
209. See infra Part VI.C.
210. See, e.g., Galloway v. Ga. Tech. Auth., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 12042, at *7-
11 (1 1th Cir. May 16, 2006) (affirming trial court order granting summary judgment to
employer, concluding that allegations regarding plaintiffs pay raise, promotion, and
termination were not retaliatory because employer proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for each, and none of the other allegations of retaliation amounted to an adverse
employment action, because none "had any tangible effect on [his] employment"); James v.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376-80 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming trial court's
order granting summary judgment to employer on retaliation claim after dividing into three
categories plaintiffs "litany of adverse changes" and concluding that no category satisfied
the requirement in a retaliation case of an adverse employment action), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 959 (2004); cf Osborne v. Elmer, 140 F. Appx. 509, at *34 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that even if the court accepted plaintiffs "theory" that "th[e] court [should decide whether]
the Postal Service's conduct 'as a whole' constituted a "campaign of retaliatory harassment'
that satisfie[d] the requirement of 'adverse employment action,"' the plaintiff "ha[d] failed
to show that the record evidence support[ed] it").
211. Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2415, 2417.
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the Court suggest that the relevant inquiry is whether the retaliatory
conduct as a whole satisfies the material adversity test, not whether each
act of alleged retaliation is materially adverse. The open question after
Burlington Northern is whether the lower federal courts will follow suit,
disaggregating each act of alleged retaliation from a larger pattern of
retaliatory conduct. Unfortunately, such an analytical framework very well
may lead to erroneous results when applied to seemingly minor acts of
retaliation-like my scheduling problems-that form a pattern of
retaliatory conduct over time.
Finally, it is precisely in organizations like Miami, which view their
management obligations largely through a legal filter, that the federal
courts' pronouncements on the contours of retaliation law matter most.
Employers that view the law as a floor, rather than a ceiling, are not the
problem; anti-discrimination law is merely part of these employers' overall
approach to workplace diversity and organizational justice. But, for those
employers who regard the law as the limit on their obligations to
employees, judicial oversight and the creation of meaningful incentives are
critical. While it is too early to predict the impact of Burlington Northern,
there is cause for concern on this count.
In Burlington Northern, the Court limited the scope of Title VII's
retaliation protection to "materially adverse" acts of retaliation, justifying
its decision to do so as a means of filtering out "trivial harms," and "petty
slights or minor annoyances. 21 2 As in sexual harassment law, however,
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that employees are filing
frivolous retaliation grievances with employers or flocking to federal court
over trivial slights. Actually, the research shows the opposite. Fear of
retaliation discourages employees from using their employers' grievance
procedures, even when other safeguards against retaliation, for example, a
collective bargaining agreement, exist.23 In fact, the research "provides
strong support for the proposition that loyal employees largely 'suffer in
silence' in response to unfair work place treatment.,
21 4
Nonetheless, as in its sexual harassment jurisprudence, the Court
allowed the perception of a problem to shape its legal analysis. As a result,
it adopted a standard of material adversity in order to balance the risk of
reprisal against what it considered the equally probable risk of employee
overreaction to petty workplace slights. Unfortunately, the message sent to
employers is that retaliation is allowed, so long as it is de minimis. The
Court's baffling statement that "[t]he anti-retaliation provision protects an
individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an
212. Id. at 2415.
213. See Peterson & Lewin, supra note 10, at 401.
214. Id.
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injury or harm" only reinforces that disturbing message.215
Moreover, it is unclear how the lower federal courts will interpret
what constitutes de minimis retaliation. The standard, according to the
Court in Burlington Northern, is whether the alleged retaliatory conduct
would "dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination. 216 But, who is this reasonable worker? In sexual
harassment law, the reasonable victim bears no resemblance to real-world
working women. Given the propensity of many federal judges to greet
claims of discrimination with skepticism and, at times, hostility, it is quite
likely that the reasonable person used henceforth in Title VII anti-
retaliation cases will bear little resemblance to the ordinary worker.2t7
C. Exit
By the spring of 1999, I had decided to leave Miami. The stress of
constant vigilance was wearing thin. Moreover, what occurred during my
fourth-year review convinced me that my application for tenure, regardless
of my record,1 8 would involve a bruising, and perhaps losing, battle.
On February 5, 1999, the tenure committee for the management
department (the "Committee") provided me with its comments on my
progress toward tenure, as part of my fourth-year review. 2'9  The
Committee concluded that I was "meeting or exceeding [its] expectations
,,220 rcieof progress toward tenure. I received positive comments on my
215. Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2414.
216. Id. (citation omitted).
217. In Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that an employee who was
terminated shortly after complaining about a co-worker's racially offensive remark failed to
state a claim under Title VII for retaliation, because he did not have an objectively
reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice that violated Title VII.
Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., No. 05-1485, 2006 WL 2337333, at *5-8 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2006).
The co-worker, upon seeing a television news program about the arrest of the snipers who
had murdered 13 people in D.C., Virginia, and Maryland, allegedly commented: "They
should put those black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the apes fuck
them." Id. at *1. The court explained that "no objectively reasonable person" could
conclude that this single "abhorrent slur" would constitute a racially hostile work
environment. Id. at *6.
218. Cf Sharon K. Parker and Mark A. Griffin, What Is So Bad About a Little Name-
Calling? Negative Consequences of Gender Harassment for Overperformance Demands
and Distress, 7 J. Occ. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 195, 206 (2002) (concluding that "one reason that
gender-harassing behaviors are harmful for [ I women [in traditionally male occupations] is
because these behaviors lead to women feeling they need to overperform to be accepted and
recognized within the organization").
219. Letter from The Department of Management Tenure Committee, Sch. of Bus.,
Miami Univ., to author, February 5, 1999 (on file with author).
220. Id.
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teaching, scholarship, and service. 22' The dean of the business school made
brief handwritten comments on the bottom of the Committee's letter,
"concur[ring] with the Tenure Committee evaluation., 222 Thus, I was taken
aback to receive, little more than a month later, the following memorandum
from James Bishop, then the acting provost:
I have reviewed your fourth-year dossier as well as the
evaluative comments of the department tenure committee and
Dean Knight. It is evident that your colleagues are satisfied with
your progress toward tenure and that you are developing a record
of professional accomplishment consistent with their
expectations.
While I concur in your colleagues' assessments of your
teaching and service, I am less accepting of the nature,
sufficiency and quality of your published work. I believe it
would be prudent to seek informally an early external evaluation
of your published work to assess its scholarly rigor and also to
establish an informed opinion of how your body of work fits
against expectations nationally for tenure aspirants at leading
non-doctoral programs.
I wish you well in your ongoing professional efforts and take
note of your achievements to date. 23
Dr. Bishop's memo surprised me because I had published or had had
accepted for publication four articles, three of which were lengthy law
review pieces, in a period of three and a half years. I sent both a formal
letter and an e-mail to Dr. Bishop asking him to explain "what factors led
[him] to question the nature, sufficiency, and quality of my research such
that I need[ed] to obtain early external review of my work?, 224  His
response stunned me. Dr. Bishop admitted that he had "not read [my]
scholarship nor [did he] feel qualified to evaluate several of [my]
papers., 225 But, he contended that "the 'nature, sufficiency and quality' of
221. Id.
222. Id. (handwritten comments dated February 11, 1999).
223. Memorandum re: Fourth-Year Review from James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami
Univ., to author, March 9, 1999 (on file with author) (memorandum headings omitted).
224. Letter from author to James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami Univ., March 10, 1999,
at I (emphasis in original) (on file with author); E-mail from author to James Bishop, Acting
Provost, Miami Univ. (March 10, 1999, 16:33 EST) (on file with author).
225. E-mail from James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami Univ., to author (March 11,
1999, 15:44 EST) [hereinafter Bishop Response] (on file with author). Reprints of my
journal articles were not forwarded to Dr. Bishop along with the other materials for my
fourth-year review. Memorandum from Kevin Black, Chairman, and Mark Jones,
Chairman, Tenure Comm., Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., to Rex Knight, Dean,
Sch. of Bus., Miami Univ., and James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami Univ., April 12, 1999,
at 1 [hereinafter Resubmission Memo] (on file with author). But, given the fact that Dr.
Bishop stated that he felt unqualified to judge my scholarship, the absence of reprints likely
had no effect on Dr. Bishop's decision to flag my fourth-year review portfolio.
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[my] work was not as clearly demonstrated as [he] believe[d] [would] be
necessary when [I was] reviewed for tenure. 226
Dr. Bishop further claimed that the reason for early external review in
my case was the dearth of "faculty locally [with] a sufficiently well
informed understanding of [my] field of legal scholarship as to ensure [me]
the depth and breadth of constructive advice most probationary faculty
[were] able to receive within the University. ' 227 Only three years before,
however, the university had tenured my mentor Martin Brown without
requiring him to submit his scholarly portfolio to early external review. At
that time, David Hogan was the only tenured business law faculty member
in the business school, and he had never published a law review article.
28
When I was hired into the finance department, there were only two
business law faculty members, one of whom was Professor Hogan. Yet, in
the management department, two faculty members, while not attorneys, did
publish in law reviews. Thus, any structural problem resulting from the
paucity of local faculty equipped to judge my scholarship existed when the
University hired me and tenured Professor Brown, and did not result from
the move of my departmental home.
Moreover, I was the only faculty member across the entire university
to whom Dr. Bishop's suggestion of early external review applied. When I
received Dr. Bishop's original memo expressing concern about my
scholarship, I requested, pursuant to Ohio's public records law, "[c]opies of
the promotion and tenure review letters written" by Dr. Bishop to all
tenure-track faculty during the 1998-99 academic year.2 29 Dr. Bishop wrote
letters to seven other probationary faculty members, and in each he echoed
the comments or concerns of either the department and/or the dean of the
school in which the faculty member was housed.23° Mine was the only case
in which he disagreed with the department's observations about the faculty
member's progress toward tenure.23' Moreover, I was the only faculty
member to whom he suggested early external review.232
The members of the management department, disturbed not only by
Dr. Bishop's questioning of my scholarly record, but also by his implicit
suggestion that the department was not competent to evaluate my work,
once again intervened on my behalf. At my chairman's behest, I provided
additional documentation, e.g., journal acceptance rates, to the management
226. See Bishop Response, supra note 225.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
229. OHIo REV. CODE § 149.43 (2006); Letter from author to Melissa Wright, Gen.
Counsel, Miami Univ., March 10, 1999 (on file with author).
230. Letters to Probationary Faculty from James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami Univ.,
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department's tenure committee. Professor Black and Mark Jones, the
chairman of the department's tenure committee, subsequently submitted
additional documentation to Dr. Bishop, accompanied by a letter explaining
why the members of the "Management Department [were] fully competent
to review [my] scholarship., 233 Three days later, Dr. Bishop retracted his
earlier suggestion that I obtain early external review, based on the
department's "assurance" that it was "fully competent to review" my
scholarly work.3 Dr. Bishop also noted that the additional documentation
provided to him "clearly support[ed] the Tenure Committee's earlier
assessment" of the timeliness and relevance of my research.235
I realized that my experiences with Dr. Bishop during my sexual
harassment case had tainted his ability to objectively evaluate my work.
Dr. Bishop disguised his bias behind facially helpful suggestions-the
benefit of early external review for a faculty member who counted few
lawyers among her colleagues on campus. But, his memo to me was
retaliation-an ultimately successful attempt to punish me for pursuing my
sexual harassment case and challenging his and the university's
interpretations of university policy and procedure.236
While I had prevailed once again, this latest dust-up with the
administration was the last straw for me. I began in earnest to look for
another job. At the end of March of 2000, having secured other
employment, I tendered my resignation to the university.
VII. EPILOGUE
Looking back on my time at Miami, I realize that reporting Professor
White's harassment started a chain of events that led ultimately to my
leaving the university. Reporting the harassment did little good. I simply
exchanged one problem-harassment-for another-retaliation. I was like
Odysseus, trying to chart a safe course between two perilous alternatives.
2
11
I confronted a problem faced by many victims of harassment: while
the law encourages them to report harassment to their employers, it does
very little to make reporting a reasonable or safe choice in practice. The
Supreme Court in its harassment jurisprudence consistently has failed to
233. Resubmission Memo, supra note 215, at 1.
234. Letter from James Bishop, Acting Provost, Miami Univ., to Kevin Black,
Chairman, and Mark Jones, Chairman, Tenure Comm., Mgmt. Dep't., Sch. of Bus., Miami
Univ., April 15, 1999 (on file with author).
235. Id.
236. See supra Part V.B. and accompanying text; see also Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18,20 (2005) (stating that when people "voic[e] their concerns
about bias and discrimination... retaliation often steps in to punish the offender and restore
the social norms in question").
237. See supra note 1.
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recognize that harassment is not a random event; it is far more likely to
occur in particular kinds of workplaces. But, it is in precisely these
workplaces, such as the business school at Miami University, where
reporting harassment is the most risky due to the threat of retaliation.
Rather than address the structural causes of harassment, however, the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have placed the burden for
change on those least able to bear it: the victims of workplace harassment.
Moreover, I hold out little hope that the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Burlington Northern heralds a more nuanced and realistic
approach to anti-discrimination law. Nor do I expect that this narrative, my
earlier work on sexual harassment, or any of the numerous law review
articles documenting the significant shortcomings of sexual harassment law
will effect significant legal change. Instead, my purpose in recounting my
tale of harassment is simply to give voice to the other side of the story-the
costs to victims of following the law's dictate to report harassment. Thus,
the next time that a woman confides to you, the reader, her story of sexual
harassment, perhaps you will hesitate before asking: "Why didn't you just
report him?
' 238
238. Louise Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 117
(1995).
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